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ABSTRACT
Facing an increase of hate speech incidents on campus and in society at large, egalitarians
have made great efforts to advocate (when there is no regulation) or to defend (when there is
regulation) hate speech regulation. Meanwhile, civil libertarians have counter argued forcefully.
This paper is designed to do an internal critique of various egalitarian arguments. Part I is
introduction. Part II and Part III give a concise description of many egalitarian arguments. Part
IV tries to do an internal critique of those arguments. Part V is the conclusion: though
egalitarians have made a great effort to advocate or defend hate speech regulation, their evidence
and reasoning does not support their position very well, especially with respect to the so-called
face-to-face hate speech regulation. Part VI is a cursory comment and defense of what federal
courts have done so far with respect to hate speech regulation.

INDEX WORDS:

Hate speech, Egalitarians, Civil libertarians, Internal critique

REGULATION OF HATE SPEECH: AN ATTEMPTED INTERNAL CRITIQUE OF
EGALITARIAN ARGUMENTS

by

HAIPING DENG
LL.M., Peking University, P.R. China, 2001
LL.B., Peking University, P.R. China, 1998

A Thesis Submitted to the Graduate Faculty of The University of Georgia in Partial Fulfillment
of the Requirements for the Degree

MASTER OF LAWS

ATHENS, GEORGIA
2004

© 2004
Haiping Deng
All Rights Reserved

REGULATION OF HATE SPEECH: AN ATTEMPTED INTERNAL CRITIQUE OF
EGALITARIAN ARGUMENTS

by

HAIPING DENG

Electronic Version Approved:
Maureen Grasso
Dean of the Graduate School
The University of Georgia
May 2004

Major Professor:

Michael L. Wells

Committee:

Dan T. Coenen

-iv-

DEDICATION
TO MY INNOCENT AND IGNORANT BUT ASPIRING PAST YEARS

-v-

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Michael L. Wells:
Dan T. Coenen:
Gabriel M. Wilner:
Kelly Smith:

Thanks him for being my major professor and his comments
Thanks him for comments, corrections and warm encouragement
Thanks him for his effort to bring us LL.M. students together
Thanks her for much help

-vi-

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS .................................................................................................................v
CHAPTER
I

INTRODUCTION..............................................................................................................1
A. The Two Camps........................................................................................................1
B. Purpose ......................................................................................................................3
C. Structure ....................................................................................................................3

II

EGALITARIANS: HATE SPEECH SHALL BE REGULATED..................................6
A. Harms of Hate Speech..............................................................................................6
B. Political Imperativeness and Legal Commitment.................................................11
C. International Trend .................................................................................................13
D. What Is Hate Speech in Egalitarian Arguments? .................................................15

III CIVIL LIBERTARIANS: FROM THE PERSPECTIVE OF EGALITARIANS........17
A. More Speech? .........................................................................................................17
B. Best Friend? ............................................................................................................21
C. Reverse Enforcement?............................................................................................22
D. Censorship?.............................................................................................................24
E. Aberration/Minimal? ..............................................................................................28
F. Pressure Valve?.......................................................................................................29
G. Should Not Be Driven Underground?...................................................................30

-viiH. Victimization?.........................................................................................................31
I. Differential Effect? ..................................................................................................32
J. Waste of Time/Resources?......................................................................................34
IV EVALUATION: INTERNAL CRITIQUE OF EGALITARIAN ARGUMENTS......36
A. Critique of the Utilization of Social Science Studies...........................................36
B. Critique of the Resort to the International Trend..................................................39
C. Critique of Scope, Severity and Uniqueness of Hate Speech ..............................43
D. Critique of Political Imperativeness and Legal Commitment .............................52
E. Critique of Egalitarian Counterarguments ............................................................56
F. Egalitarians: Too Close to Equal Protection .........................................................63
V

CONCLUSION ................................................................................................................65

VI EPILOGUE: A DEFENSE OF FEDERAL COURT DECISIONS ..............................66
BIBLIOGRAPHY...............................................................................................................................70
TABLE OF CASES ............................................................................................................................75

-1-

CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
A. The Two Camps
Beginning around 1979, with an increase of hate speech incidents in the society at large,1
many American universities and colleges began noticing an upsurge of hate speech incidents on
campus. 2 In response, many universities and colleges have enacted student conduct rules
prohibiting hate speech directed against persons on account of their race, ethnicity, religion, sex,
sexual orientation or other factors.3 Even outside the campus context, there appeared some kind
of hate speech regulation. 4 These rules were challenged and struck down by courts, 5 have

1

Richard Delgado & David H. Yun, Pressure Valves and Blooded Chickens: An Analysis of Paternalistic
Objections to Hate Speech Regulation, 82 CAL. L. REV. 871, 872 (1994).
2
Id. For a good list of some widely publicized campus hate speech incidents, see Richard Delgado, Campus
Antiracism Rules: Constitutional Narratives in Collision, 85 NW. U.L. REV. 343, 349-358 (1991). There has been a
similar upsurge in society at large. Id. at 348, footnote 26. For a good list of hate speech incidents not limited to the
campus context, see Mari J. Matsuda, Legal Storytelling: Public Response to Racist Speech: Considering the
Victim’s Story, 87 MICH. L. REV. 2320, 2320-30 (1989).
3
For example, University of Michigan and University of Wisconsin promulgated new student conduct codes facing
such an upsurge. Both codes were challenged and struck down by courts as unduly vague and overbroad so in
violation of the First Amendment. See Doe v. University of Michigan, 721 F. Supp. 852 (E.D. Mich. 1989) and The
UWM Post, Inc. v. Board of Regents of University of Wisconsin System, 774 F. Supp. 1163 (E.D. Wis. 1991). The
University of Michigan rule prohibited “[any] behavior, verbal or physical, that stigmatizes or victimizes an
individual on the basis of race, ethnicity, religion, sex, sexual orientation, creed, national origin, ancestry, age,
marital status, handicap or Vietnam-era veteran status” in “educational and academic centers, such as classroom
buildings, libraries, research laboratories, recreation and study centers[.]” Doe, 721 F. Supp. at 856. The University
of Wisconsin rule prohibited racist or discriminatory comments, epithets or other expressive behavior or physical
conduct that intentionally “[d]emean the race, sex, religion, color, creed, disability, sexual orientation, national
origin, ancestry or age of the individual or individuals[.]” UWM Post, 774 F. Supp. at 1165. For a good description
of University of Michigan incidents dealt with after the new conduct code was promulgated, see Robert A. Sedler,
The Unconstitutionality of Campus Bans on “Racist Speech:” The View From Without and Within, 53 U. PITT. L.
REV. 631, 639-46 (1992). Between forty and fifty policies have been adopted or modified to redress the problem of
increased ethnoviolence on campus. See Charles H. Jones, Equality, Dignity and Harm: the Constitutionality of
Regulating American Campus Ethnoviolence, 37 WAYNE L. REV. 1383, 1399 (1991). Professor Henry McGee has
examined the policies of forty schools – fifteen colleges and twenty-five universities. See Henry McGee, A Typology
of College and University Racial Harassment and Speech Policies, quoted in Charles H. Jones, id, at 1399-1402.
4
For example, in May 1997, Village of Skokie, Illinois passed three ordinances to prevent the National Socialist
Party of America (“NSPA”)’s use of the village hall. Donald A. Downs, Skokie Revisited: Hate Group Speech and
the First Amendment, 60 NOTRE D AME L. REV. 629 (1985). One ordinance stated: “[t]he dissemination of any

-2prompted hot debates, and split people into two camps: egalitarians and civil libertarians. 6
Egalitarians argue that the issue of equality should occupy the center stage.7 Since hate speech
violates the victim’s constitutional right 8 and human right 9 to be treated equally and
respectfully,10 they have advanced various arguments to advocate, if there is no regulation, and
to defend, if there is regulation, hate speech rules. In contrast, civil libertarians see a completely
different world. They declare that these rules are a free speech problem.11 Accordingly, from the
perspective of free speech protection, they have also advanced a lot of reasons why hate speech,
though much deplorable, should not be regulated,

12

and egalitarians are seen by them as

aggressors attempting to curtail a precious liberty. 13 How to evaluate this lively exchange?

materials within the Village of Skokie which promotes and incites hatred against persons by reason of their race,
national origin, or religion, and is intended to do so, is hereby prohibited.” Id., footnote 3. See also Village of Skokie
v. National Socialist Party, 51 Ill. App. 3d 279, 366 N.E.2d 347 (1977), modified, 69 Ill. 2d 605, 373 N.E.2d 21
(1978), and Collin v. Smith, 578 F.2d 1197 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 916 (1978), where the ordinance was
truck down. In 1990, City of St. Paul, Minnesota enacted Legis. Code § 292.02, which stated “[w]hoever places on
public or private property a symbol, object, appellation, characterization or graffiti, including, but not limited to, a
burning cross or Nazi swastika, which one knows or has reasonable grounds to know arouses anger, alarm or
resentment in others on the basis of race, color, creed, religion or gender commits disorderly conduct and shall be
guilty of a misdemeanor.” R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 380 (1992). But the primary effort to restrict
racist speech in American society is taking place on university campuses today. See Robert A. Sedler, supra note 3,
at 635.
5
The University of Michigan rule, the University of Wisconsin rule, the Village of Skokie rule and the St. Paul rule
were all struck down. See supra notes 3 and 4. Besides, in 1995, a California state court struck down a similar
Stanford University standard of conduct. Corry v. Stanford, No. 740309 (Cal. Super. Ct. Santa Clara Co. Feb. 27,
1995), on the basis of a California statute which provided that a private university may not impose limitations on
speech that would violate the First Amendment if imposed by a public university. Id.
6
Charles H. Jones, supra note 3, at 1383. Mr. Jones, like others, often refers to the egalitarians as “equalitarians,”
but I was persuaded by my major professor Michael L. Wells that the former is a better word. See also Richard
Delgado, supra note 2, 345-48 for a summary of the two camps. It is worth noting that not all those arguing for
regulation are traditional egalitarians, for example, Charles R. Lawrence III is a traditional civil libertarian, but he
argues for hate speech regulation. See Nadine Strossen, Regulating Hate Speech on Campus: A Modest Proposal?
1990 D UKE L. J. 484, 496 (1990). But for the purpose of this paper, in order to avoid complication, anyone arguing
for hate speech regulation is regarded as an egalitarian, while anyone arguing against regulation a civil libertarian.
7
Richard Delgado & Jean Stefanic, Hate Speech, Loving Community: Why Our Notion of “A Just Balance”
Changes So Slowly? 82 CALIF. L. REV. 851, 852 (1994).
8
Richard Delgado, Words That Wound: A Tort Action for Racial Insults, Epithets, and Name-Calling, 17 HARV.
C.R.-C.L. REV. 133, 143 (1982).
9
Mari J. Matsuda, supra note 2, at 2344-45.
10
Richard Delgado, supra note 8, at 143.
11
Richard Delgado & Jean Stefanic, supra note 7, at 851.
12
This is just a very cursory summary of the two camps. For detailed descriptions of arguments from both camps,
see Parts II and III below.
13
Richard Delgado & Jean Stefanic, supra note 7.

-3B. Purpose
This paper tries to do such an evaluation, though in a particularly incomplete way: it only tries
to do an internal critique 14 of the egalitarian arguments, though at the same time it will of
necessity touch upon civil libertarian arguments. 15 Anyway, when egalitarian arguments are
strengthened or weakened by subsequent discussion, the civil libertarian case becomes weaker or
stronger in an indirect way. In this sense, civil libertarian arguments are evaluated here, though
quite incompletely. In addition, this paper will mainly concentrate on theoretical arguments made
by egalitarians to establish that hate speech should be regulated. In another word, its emphasis is
not on how relevant court decisions have developed and what they are, though there will be a
cursory comment on them at the very end of this paper.16 Accordingly, it does not concern itself
with whether hate speech could be regulated in consistence with current free speech law.17
C. Structure
In order to do an internal critique of egalitarian arguments, the rest of this paper is divided
into several parts. Part II will summarize part of the arguments made by the egalitarians

14

“Internal critique” used as an evaluation method in this paper mainly asks this question: assuming egalitarians are
right in contending that hate speech should be regulated, how well is their position supported by their evidences and
reasoning? See also Part IV below for more detailed discussion of the concept of “internal critique.”
15
The main reason is that to do an overall evaluation is simply beyond my ability, since I have found out that it is
particularly hard for me to do a good or even mediocre criticism of civil libertarian arguments. Another reason is
that to do such an overall evaluation would make this paper unmanageable for me, whose writing skills are not
particularly good for this task of overall evaluation.
16
See Part VI below.
17
This has been done by several authors. See, e.g., Jack M. Battaglia, Regulation of Hate Speech by Educational
Institutions: a Proposed Policy, 31 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 345 (1991) (proposing a model hate speech regulation
that arguably would stand under the current free speech law framework); and Richard Delgado & David Yun, supra
note 1, at 886-88 (arguing that in the wake of various court decisions, the task of drafting a hate speech regulation
rule that would be upheld by courts constitutional is still technically feasible). It seems that they are arguing that the
reason that hate speech rules were struck down is that they are poorly drafted. For similar arguments, see Rodney A.
Smolla, Rethinking First Amendment Assumptions about Racist and Sexist Speech, 47 WASH . & LEE L. REV. 171,
208 (1990) (“the University failed to confine sufficiently its definition of covered speech”), and Charles R.
Lawrence III, If He Hollers Let Him Go: Regulating Racist Speech on Campus, 1990 DUKE L.J. 431, 477-78 n.161
(1990). But see Robert A. Sedler, supra note 3, at 633 (arguing that no matter how narrowly tailored, any campus
hate speech regulation is targeted at racist ideas, thus would be unconstitutional under the current free speech
framework). See also Nadine Strossen, supra note 6, at 495-507 (pointing out that some limited forms of campus
hate speech could be regulated consistently with the current constitutional law).

-4defending regulation of hate speech, which focus on harms of hate speech, the political
imperativeness of and legal commitment to hate speech regulation, and the international proregulation trend. In a sense, egalitarian arguments in this part could be labeled
“affirmative/positive arguments” in that they are offered not mainly as refutation but as
affirmative reasons why hate speech should be regulated. This feature distinguishes these
arguments from those discussed in Part III, which are offered as refutation to civil libertarian
arguments. In this sense, egalitarian arguments in Part III could accordingly be termed as
“defensive/passive arguments.” The basic structure of Part III is to first summarize civil
libertarian arguments and then to focus more closely on egalitarian counterarguments. With Part
II and Part III, taken together, constituting a roughly complete picture of egalitarian arguments,
Part IV tries to do an internal critique of egalitarian arguments and counterarguments. It is
pointed out that their arguments and counterarguments are generally problematic. There are too
many incoherencies, contradictions or defects. Part V is a summary of the conclusion of this
paper: while egalitarians have made a good case for hate speech regulation, their arguments are
far from convincing, not to say conclusive. So their case for hate speech regulation is called into
much doubt. Part VI gives a cursory defense of what federal courts have done so far in the area
of hate speech. It is argued that what they have done is not only understandable, but also very
wise. But before we go to the main body of this paper, a point needs to make clear: the paper is
not intended to cover any and all arguments made by all egalitarians. This would be a too
ambitious project to be manageable for a person like me with very limited understanding of
American constitutional law. So, in an effort to make life easier for myself, in discussion of
egalitarian arguments, I will generally concentrate on Richard Delgado’s arguments mainly,
since seemingly he has been an arch-warrior advocating and defending hate speech regulation

-5and has written so extensively that his arguments almost represent a full picture of the egalitarian
case for hate speech regulation. Of course, when necessary and convenient, other egalitarians’
arguments will be discussed also, or at least will be cited (when their arguments are the same
with or similar to Mr. Delgado’s). In a word, Mr. Delgado’s arguments run through the line of
narration, while others’ dot the line here and there. So, a related point is, the general conclusion
of this paper (Part V) only has limited validity. This conclusion should be interpreted
contextually only within the framework of this paper, though various specific points of internal
critique may apply to egalitarian arguments similar but not covered here.
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CHAPTER II
EGALITARIANS: HATE SPEECH SHALL BE REGULATED
When advocating or defending hate speech regulation, egalitarians have argued that hate
speech has great and real harms on the victim. In addition, it is also argued that hate speech has
great harms on the perpetrator and society as a whole.18 Furthermore, some egalitarians have
even tried to argue that there is political imperativeness of and legal commitment to hate speech
regulation. If these are not enough, there is the international pro-regulation trend, to which many
egalitarians have made an emphatic appeal. This part will give a summary of these three themes
of argument in turn in the following subsections.
A. Harms of Hate Speech
1. Harms to the Hate Speech Victim
Harms of hate speech on the victim include (1) direct mental or emotional distress, (2)
personal dignity injury, (3) reputational injury, (4) psychological injury, (5) relational injury, (6)
physical injury, and even (7) pecuniary injury. The first harm, i.e., direct mental or emotional
distress is the most obvious one, and almost everyone talks about it when defending hate speech
regulation.19 Hate speech’s harm to personal dignity,20 related to the first harm, is quite easy to

18

One feature of discussion of many egalitarians needs to be noted here. When they are talking about hate speech’s
harms, they generally tend to mainly talk about hate speech based on race, that is, racial insults, though sometimes
they do talk about other types of insults when convenient. For them, undoubtedly, harms of racial insults generally
apply to other types of hate speech. See, for example, Charles R. Lawrence III, supra note 17. In that article, it
seems that Mr. Lawrence uses hate speech to mean insulting speech based on one’s race, gender, or sexual
orientation, id. at 436, while mainly using incidents where racial slurs are involved.
19
See, e.g., Richard Delgado, supra note 8; Charles R. Lawrence III, supra note 17, at 459-61 (using his sister’s
story to exemplify that hate speech will inflict direct mental or emotional distress in the victim). Besides, it is
pointed out that this harm is especially severe when hate speech is delivered in front of others or by a person in a
position of authority. Richard Delgado, id.

-7understand. No one would like to be humiliated by degrading words of whatever form. The
reputational harm seems an easy question too, since hate speech is often unfounded, and actually
is a form of group defamation condemned by Brown v. Board of Education,21 according to one
author.22 To establish other harms of hate speech, the theory of social construction of reality23
and social studies are heavily relied upon.24 The social construction of reality theory runs like
this: speech communicating low regard for an individual because of one’s race tends to create in
one those very traits of ‘inferiority’ that it ascribes to one, 25 especially when one’s daily
experience tells one that almost nowhere in society is one respected and granted the ordinary
dignity and courtesy accorded to others.26 What makes things worse is that such kind of social
construction will happen even in the absence of more objective forms of discrimination – poor
schools, menial jobs and substandard housing and so on,27 since hate speech tend to convey,
explicitly or implicitly, traditional stereotypes about the low ability and apathy of the black
people or other minorities,28 and these stereotypes are self-fulfilling prophecies.29 In a word, with

20

Richard Delgado, supra note 8, at 146; Richard Delgado, Book Review: Toward a Legal Realist View of the First
Amendment, 113 HARV. L. REV. 778, 786 (2000).
21
347 U.S. 483 (1954).
22
Charles R. Lawrence III, supra note 17, at 462.
23
Richard Delgado, Book Review, supra note 20, at 787; Richard Delgado, First Amendment Legal Formalism Is
Giving Way to First Amendment Legal Realism, 29 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 169, 171-72 (1994).
24
These studies include: a study that American blacks have higher blood pressure levels; an experiment testing
blacks and whites of similar aptitudes and capacities that showed the blacks exhibited defeatism, half-hearted
competitiveness, and high expectancies of failure; and another experiment where several children were studied.
These children are: a black girl who preferred the light-skinned doll than the dark but otherwise identical one;
another black girl hated her skin and washed intensively her arms and face until they were almost white; another
black child who preferred to use white clay rather than the brown clay to make a little girl since the white clay
would make a better girl; and young children who used “rough, funny, stupid, silly, smelly, stinky, dirty” to describe
physical characteristics of black people. See Richard Delgado, supra note 8, at 139-40, 142-43.
25
Richard Delgado, supra note 8, at 146, quoting M. Deutsch, I. Katz & A. Jensen, S OCIAL CLASS, RACE AND
PSYCHOLOGICAL DEVELOPMENT 175 (1968).
26
Id, at 136-37, quoting Kenneth Clark, DARK GHETTO 63-64 (1965). See also Richard Delgado, First Amendment,
supra note 23, at 172 (“Incessant depiction of a group as lazy, stupid, and hypersexual – or ornamental for that
matter – constructs social reality so that members of that group are always one-down. Thereafter, even the most
scrupulously neutral laws and rules will not save them from falling further and further behind as private actions
compound their disadvantage.”).
27
Richard Delgado, supra note 8, at 146.
28
Id.

-8the effect of social construction of reality, people subject to hate speech become self-doubt, selfhatred and isolated.30 The problem is a more severe one if it is taken into account that hate
speech’s psychological effects tend to accompany the victim for a very long time, even a whole
life. Those minorities who succeed “do not enjoy the full benefits of their professional status
within their organizations, because of inconsistent treatment by others resulting in continual
psychological stress, strain, and frustration.” 31 This makes hate speech more an evil than
otherwise it would be. With one humiliated very often by others, self-doubted, self-hated, and
isolated, it follows quite naturally that one’s relationships with others are injured.32 Even one’s
relationships with members of one’s own group are adversely influenced. 33 In addition,
according to one author, this long-term psychological injury, in turn, may have physical
consequences, for example, making the victim’s blood pressure consistently and abnormally
high.34 According to the same author, one’s pecuniary interest would be damaged also,35 since
the psychological injury severely handicaps one’s ability to pursue opportunities according to an
experiment.36 In addition, there are several social studies suggesting that hate speech has greater
impact on children,37 and this should make us more willing to regulate hate speech.
2. Harms to the Perpetrator
When it comes to harms to the perpetrator, one tends naturally to think about physical harms.
Anyway, the perpetrator, by insulting the victim, has a great chance of exciting angry reaction on
the part of the victim. Undoubtedly, a deeply wounded victim might attack the perpetrator on the
29

Id.
Id, at 137.
31
Id, at 138.
32
Id.
33
Id.
34
Id. at 139.
35
Id.
36
Id. at 139-40. Here an experiment where some black persons exemplified defeatism and so on is used to support
this argument. See also supra note 24.
30

-9spot. Even if the victim does not win the fight, the chances are that both would be wounded
physically. And if the perpetrator is not attacked on the spot due to various reasons,38 there is still
chance that later on the victim, seizing some opportune moment, might physically attack the
perpetrator. But it is not such possible physical harms that some egalitarians are concerned about.
Their idea is a more subtle one: hate speech reflects stereotypes, which, when held dear by one,
will contribute to one’s bigotry; so, hate speech, as a form of bigotry, harms one by reinforcing
rigid thinking, thereby dulling one’s moral and social senses. 39 This kind of blindness will
probably lead to a mildly paranoid mentality.40
3. Harms to the Society as a Whole
With the victim deeply harmed, and the perpetrator subtly harmed also, the society as a whole
undoubtedly loses. But it is not just so. Hate speech, as part of racism, if unaddressed, breaches
the egalitarian ideal,41 a cornerstone of the American moral and legal system.42 A society where
some members are subjected to degradation because of their race hardly exemplifies this ideal.43
When the legal system fails to address harms of hate speech, a lesson will be conveyed to all that
egalitarianism is not a fundamental principle as it is on the books. Thus, even those preferring to
live in a truly equal society may be demoralized by such a lesson and become unwilling
participators in the perpetration of racism and racial inequality. 44 Anyway, when one is

37

See supra note 24.
For example, the victim is just one person, but the perpetrator is with several others. Under this circumstance,
rational judgment would caution against on-the-spot action. Nonetheless, the victim, if deeply wounded and in a
mood to revenge the dignity wound, might attack the perpetrator when he or she is alone.
39
Richard Delgado, supra note 8, at 140.
40
Id. See also Mari J. Matsuda, supra note 2, at 2338-39. See also, Michael Kent Curtis, “Free Speech” and Its
Discontents: The Rebellion against General Propositions and the Danger of Discretion, 31 WAKE FOREST L. REV.
419, 422-23 (1996).
41
Richard Delgado, supra note 8, at 140.
42
Id.
43
Id., at 141.
44
Id.
38

-10frequently exposed to hate speech degrading others, one tends to think that the message at least
conveys some truth.45
Furthermore, the society as a whole loses in another sense: hate speech, as part of racism,
contributes to a class system or the rigidity of such a system.46 In a sense, when both the majority
and the minorities begin to believe in the message contained in hate speech about bad qualities of
minorities, very bad consequences result. The majority members, with bigotry, would be
reluctant to accept minority members on an equal basis. On the other hand, the minority
members, with self-doubt and self-hatred, would be reluctant to actively communicate with
majority members. This will impede the assimilation of minority members into mainstream
economic, social and political systems, since these systems are controlled mainly by the white
majority.47 This in turn would cause the minority members to be seen and to see themselves as
outsiders.48 Thus, they are demoralized or angry, choose not to contribute their talents to society;
or, even if they want to contribute, they are prevented by the reluctance of the majority members.
This mutual reluctance49 would make the line between the majority and the minority starker, thus
making the society less mobile. In a word, with a rigid class system, the society loses the
contribution it otherwise would obtain from the minorities, so it loses by tolerating hate speech.
4. Hate Speech is Widespread
Whatever harms hate speech inflicts on the victim, the perpetrator, and society as a whole, if
hate speech is just a minor problem, the case for regulation would be still weak. So some
egalitarians have made an effort to establish that hate speech is a widespread and thus severe

45

Richard Delgado, Book Review, supra note 20, at 788.
Richard Delgado, supra note 8, at 141-42.
47
Id., at 142
48
Id.
49
It is not just reluctance. Indeed, the majority members are not only reluctant, they consciously use hate speech to
preserve for themselves an economically advantageous position. Id.; Richard Delgado, Book Review, supra note 20,
789-91.
46

-11problem. In such an effort, the 1990 report 50 of the National Institute Against Prejudice and
Violence 51 is commonly cited. According to the report, since the fall of 1986, incidents of
ethnoviolence had occurred on more than 250 college campuses.52 The report also estimated that
between 800,000 and one million students annually were involved in these incidents.53 Besides,
it also claimed that approximately twenty percent of minority students experienced some form of
ethnic or racial attack during an academic year and that one-fourth were victimized more than
once.54
B. Political Imperativeness and Legal Commitment
The arguments about political imperativeness and legal commitment are offered to further
support regulation of hate speech. According to one author, although hate speech may have
abetted the preservation of a social stratification system bringing at least some benefit to the
majority, the situation may be changing.55 The American society today is much more diverse
than before.56 It is more populous, and channels of communication place people in closer contact
with each other than ever before, multiplying opportunities for friction.57 To meet the challenges

50

Howard J. Ehrlich, Campus Ethnoviolence and Policy Options, 4 NAT’L INST. AGAINST PREJUDICE & V IOLENCE 4
(1990), quoted, for example, in Charles H. Jones, supra note 3, at 1389-90.
51
The predecessor of Prejudice Institute. See http://www.prejudiceinstitute.org/whoweare.html#Anchor-55346 (Last
visited on Feb. 29, 2004). Though I did not find this report, detailed information contained in the report could be
found in several authors’ articles. See, for example, Charles H. Jones, supra note. See also Richard Delgado, supra
note 2, at 343, n1; Richard Delgado & David H. Yun, supra note 1, at 872. Besides, by looking at Prejudice
Institute’s official website, one can have a good grasp of some relevant information contained in the report, and thus
can do some meaningful evaluation of the report. For example, the definition of “ethnoviolence” can be found on the
website. See http://www.prejudiceinstitute.org/ethnoviolenceFS.html(last visited Feb. 29, 2004), where the word
“ethnoviolence” is defined to mean “an act or an attempted act which is motivated by group prejudice and intended
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-12of global competition, society more than ever before needs the contributions and enthusiastic
participation of all its members,58 while hate speech, as discussed above, prevents people from
contributing and participating actively. For these reasons, hate speech is no longer a social
good. 59 So, regulation of hate speech seems to be logical and necessary. 60 Besides, in a
democratic society, deliberation among equals is the keystone. 61 But hate speech denigrates
minority groups needlessly, making people unequal. So dealing with hate speech may turn out to
be a necessary pre-political reckoning.62 Without such a reckoning, genuine dialogue based on
equal participation and respect will be scarce.63
When it comes to legal commitment made by the American society, one tends to think about
the equal protection clause, 64 thinking that hate speech violates people’s right to be treated
equally.65 But here the legal commitment argument is somewhat different. Since regulation of
hate speech is regarded by the civil libertarians as a form of restriction of freedom of speech, it is
argued that, even if so, the American society has made a legal commitment to restrict hate
speech. Thus, regulation of hate speech does not violate freedom of speech at all. On the
contrary, it is our duty to regulate. According to this argument, the legal commitment was made
in Brown v. Board of Education,66 which was a case about regulation of racist speech67 instead of
about black children’s equal educational opportunity.68 Segregation was held unconstitutional in
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-13Brown not simply because of the bad physical separation of black and white children, but also
and primarily because of the message segregation conveys – the message that black children are
an untouchable caste, unfit to be educated with white children.69 Segregation serves its purpose
by conveying an idea, which stamps a badge of inferiority upon blacks, and this badge
communicates a message to others in the community, as well as to blacks wearing the badge. The
message is injurious to blacks. Therefore, Brown may be read as regulating the content of racist
speech. As a regulation of racist speech, the decision is an exception to the usual rule that
regulation of speech content is presumed unconstitutional.70 So, the civil libertarian argument
that hate speech rules are content-based71 and thus unconstitutional could be well dismissed.
C. International Trend
If all of the above are not adequate to establish that hate speech shall be regulated, egalitarians
are not without recourse: there is the clear international trend for regulation. Here frequently
Article 4 72 of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial
Discrimination is first relied upon. 73 This article requires state parties to the Convention to
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-14punish all dissemination of ideas based on racial superiority or hatred,

74

to prohibit

“organizations, and also organized and all other propaganda activities” promoting and inciting
racial discrimination,75 to punish participation in such organization or activities76 and to prohibit
public authorities or public institutions from promoting or inciting racial discrimination.77 Here,
as seen by some egalitarians, there is a good argument against U.S. courts’ blind adherence to the
incitement doctrine. 78 This article never requires proof of incitement, and it prohibits mere
dissemination of racist ideas, 79 since an atmosphere of hatred would inevitably lead to
discrimination. 80 What makes the article more unique and important is that as a clearly
controversial proposition, it was unanimously adopted by the General Assembly, whereas in
other areas of international human rights consensus building, serious ideological debate dooms a
proposal to failure. In addition, the Convention gathered an increasing number of state signatures
over the years, and even United States is one of the signatory countries, though it in the end
failed to ratify it due to its concerns with the Article’s free speech inhibiting implications.81 But
many other countries adopted laws consistent with the international convention. 82 These
countries include the United Kingdom, Canada, the Netherlands, France, Austria, Germany,
Italy, the Scandinavian countries, Australia, and New Zealand.83 In a word, there is growing
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-15international movement toward outlawing racist hate propaganda. 84 Of these countries, the
United Kingdom, Canada, and the Scandinavian countries are emphasized as particularly
persuasive.85 The idea is this, because the United States shares a long common-law tradition with
the United Kingdom, Canada has adopted a similar constitutional approach to regulation of
speech,86 and the Scandinavian countries have a long tradition of protection free speech,87 and
they all have begun to regulate hate speech, then why cannot the United States just follow suit,
especially when there is no significant indication that in these countries free speech is inhibited
by hate speech regulations?88
D. What is Hate Speech in Egalitarian Arguments?
But what is hate speech, according to egalitarians? This question, though seemingly an
obvious one, is actually a difficult one. It is obvious in that almost everyone has a rough
understanding of what hate speech is. It is a difficult one in that egalitarians, with just a few
exceptions according to my reading,89 tend to fail to provide a clear definition of what hate
speech is in their mind. But it is not necessary for the purpose of this paper to ascertain a clear
definition of hate speech consistent with egalitarian arguments, though it is not impossible to do
84
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-16so.90 It suffices to say that (1) many egalitarians talks about slurs based on race, ethnicity, sex,
sexual orientation or religion, and they do not make an effort to distinguish one characteristic
from another. They discuss them together as they are just one thing;91 (2) many egalitarians are
advocating prohibition of face-to-face hate speech,92 as some campus hate speech rules prohibit
such hate speech;93 and (3) slurs based poverty are generally excluded in their concept of hate
speech.94 This last point has to do with the uniqueness of hate speech’s harms. It is argued that
hate speech is particularly evil, since it is based on personal characteristics such as race, ethnicity
or sex that are born with one. These characteristics, unlike poverty, cannot be eliminated. 95
Whatever one tries to do, one will not be able to overcome such characteristics. This makes hate
speech different from verbal slurs based on one’s poverty.96
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CHAPTER III
CIVIL LIBERTARIANS: FROM THE PERSPECTIVE OF EGALITARIANS
Of course, arguments made by egalitarians advocating and defending hate speech regulation
are not limited to those cursorily summarized in part II. Facing opposition from the civil
libertarian camp, they have counter argued forcefully, purportedly to dispel what civil
libertarians have argued. This part takes up with these arguments and counterarguments from the
two camps.
A. More Speech?
One most common civil libertarian argument is that more speech is always a preferred
response to hate speech.97 The underlying conception is the theory of marketplace of ideas, 98
which could be traced back to English philosophers John Milton and John Stuart Mill, especially
the latter.99 But for our purpose here, it will be unnecessary to get into these two philosophers’
ideas. It suffices to say that their concept of marketplace of ideas was first incorporated by
Supreme Court Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes into the American jurisprudence in his famous
97
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-18dissent to Abrams v. United States.100 Ever since then, the theory has become firmly rooted in the
First Amendment free speech jurisprudence.101 Scholars and jurists frequently have used the
theory to explain and justify the first amendment freedoms of speech and press.102 In its classic
form, the theory argues that “the best test of truth is the power of thought to get itself accepted in
a competition of the market.” 103 This theory assumes that a process of robust debate, if
uninhibited by governmental interference, will lead to the discovery of truth, or at least the best
perspectives or solutions for societal problems. A properly functioning marketplace of ideas
ultimately assures the proper evolution of society, wherever that evolution might lead.104 So,
what the “more speech” approach argues is that, let them say hate speech, and we, including hate
speech victims, talk back, and through the market process, hate speech and its underlying
concepts of racial supremacy, male supremacy and so on will be automatically rejected. Besides,
it is especially good if minorities learn to talk back rather than try to resort to hate speech
regulation, since talking back clears the air, emphasizes self-reliance, and strengthens one’s selfimage as an active agent in charge of one’s own destiny.105 Further, a minority speaking out will
be able to educate the speaker who has uttered a racially hurtful remark. 106 The idea is that
racism is the product of ignorance and fear. If a victim of racist hate speech takes the time to
explain matters, the speaker’s perception may be so altered that the speaker will not utter racist
remarks again. In a word, hate speech rules need to be opposed not only because they limit
speech, but also because it is good for minorities to learn to speak out.
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-19To this argument, there is a forceful egalitarian reply. First, it is often unwise or impossible to
talk back. Often racist remarks are delivered in several-on-one situations, the hate speech speaker
is with others, or they do hate speech together, but the victim is just alone. In this circumstance,
to talk back is foolhardy.107 Don’t you see there are many highly publicized racial homicides
where the black victim talked back to the hate speech speaker but paid his life?108 Even if hate
speech is delivered in a one-on-one situation, it would be still very hard to for the victim to talk
back. For example, how about if one white person says to a black person “Nigger, go back to
Africa. You don’t belong to America”?109 This kind of hate speech tends to make one speechless.
Then, how can one arguably talk back? Even when successful, talking back is a burden on the
victim. 110 Why should the victim be asked to treat a hateful attempt as an invitation for
discussion and thus take the burden to persuade? 111 Other racist remarks are delivered in a
cowardly fashion, by means of scrawling graffiti on a campus wall late at night or on a poster
placed outside a black student dormitory. 112 In these situations, more speech is of course
impossible.113
What if one argues that more speech or talking back does not mean only on-the-spot response,
the victim can respond by later writing and later speeches not specifically targeted at the very
hate speech speaker? This question is readily answered by some egalitarians. Sure, in this
instance, the victim runs no risk of being physically attacked. But the undue burden is still there.
Furthermore, speech is expensive, not all can afford the cost of a microphone, computer, or
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-20television airtime.114 What makes more speech more implausible is that hate speech, by unduly
undermining minorities’ credibility, makes it harder for the minority speaker to speak out.115
People tend to do not believe what they are saying. For example, in the course of a conversation
among several people, a woman will make a suggestion and the conversation will continue as
though little had happened. Later, a man will raise the same idea, which everyone will praise and
then describe as “Bill’s idea.”116 It is argued that, since the message is the same, the reason for
the different reception can only lie in the belief that all women and minorities are inherently
unworthy of belief, and this belief is conveyed and strengthened by hate speech.117
Egalitarians are also wary of the underlying conception of marketplace of ideas. They have
pointed out that marketplace has its process defects, and there is no assurance that the truth will
be discovered and the right idea will ultimately win the competition.118 This is perhaps especially
true for United States, since the American marketplace of ideas was founded with the idea of the
racial inferiority of non-whites as one of its chief commodities, and ever since the marketplace
opened, racism has remained its most active item in trade.119 This racist idea infects, skews, and
disables the operation of the marketplace of ideas like a computer virus.120 Thus, words and ideas
of blacks and other despised minorities are less saleable in the market.121 Besides, since hate
speech silences ideas, the total amount of speech that enters the market also decreases. In a word,
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-21the “process defect” is so ubiquitous, there is no reason to believe that the marketplace of ideas
will and does function well.122
B. Best Friend?
The idea in the “best friend” argument is that the First Amendment historically has been a
great friend and ally of social reformers, including minorities. It is argued that, for example, the
civil rights movement of the 1960s depended upon free speech principles.123 These principles
allowed protestors to carry their message to audiences who found such messages highly
offensive and threatening to their most deeply cherished views of themselves and their way of
life.124 Only strong principles of free speech and association could – and did – protect the drive
for desegregation.125 For example, the Birmingham parade ordinance that Martin Luther King, Jr.
and other demonstrators had violated was declared an unconstitutional invasion of their free
speech rights.126 In a word, without free speech, how could Martin Luther King, Jr. have moved
the American public as he did?127 It is through the market process that King’s ideas of civil rights
in the end are accepted by the people.
In the eyes of egalitarians, this “best friend” argument is equally an illusion. A “realistic view
of history” shows that the system of free speech law has not always served as a staunch ally of
minority interests. For example, in the sixties, black protesters sat in, marched, and picketed and
so on, and they were often arrested and convicted. 128 True, some of these convictions were
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-22reversed on appeal, but only after years and after thousands of dollars of legal fees and untold
hours of gallant lawyering.129 Black protesters’ protestation was often concluded by the court to
be too intermixed with action or too disruptive of property rights.130
And a related argument that free speech has made America a great country131 is rejected. It is
argued that, United States’ unquestionable leading position in two principal areas – economic
production and military might – shall be contributed not to freedom of expression but bunches of
exceptions to it, such as patents, copyrights, trade secrets, and official (military) secrets. 132
Indeed, a truly free press and citizenry, able to speak, learn, and circulate ideas freely in these
areas of exception, would have interfered with the development of the prodigious industrial and
military base that the United States today enjoys.133 In addition, hate speech contributes greatly
to inequality and social pathology. 134 For example, today, United States ranks low among
western industrialized countries in equality of wealth and income, and the figures for infant
mortality, life expectancy, and broken families in black and brown communities remain abysmal,
and “it seems highly likely that tolerating virulent hate speech and vicious public depiction plays
a part in allowing these forms of social misery to develop and persist.”135
C. Reverse Enforcement?
The “reverse enforcement” argument is that hate speech rules are sure to hurt minorities
because they will be applied against minorities themselves.136 A vicious insult hurled by a white
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-23person to a black will go unpunished, while even a mild expression of exasperation by a black
motorist to a police officer or by a black student to a professor, for example, will bring harsh
sanctions. For example, it is asserted that in Canada, shortly after the Supreme Court upheld a
federal hate speech code, prosecutors began charging blacks with offenses.137
To this argument, it is conceded that, since certain authorities are racist and dislike blacks
who speak out of turn, and since a few incidents of blacks charged with hate speech for
innocuous behavior have occurred, this argument is plausible.138 Nonetheless, it is argued, the
empirical evidence does not suggest that this is the pattern, not to say the rule. Evidence
includes: police and FBI reports showing that hate crimes are committed much more frequently
by whites against blacks than the reverse;139 statistics compiled by the National Institute Against
Violence and Prejudice confirming the reports;140 and the distribution of enforcement seemingly
consistent with commission of the offense.141 True, while an occasional minority group member
may be charged with violating a campus hate speech code, these prosecutions seem rare.142 Still,
when a minority person is charged with such a violation, it is not a reason to worry about the hate
speech rules, since racism is not a one-way street; some minorities do harass and badger
whites143 and so deserve punishment.144 But how about a recent study showing that hate speech
regulation in South Africa and the former Soviet Union have been used to stifle dissenters and
members of minority groups?145 It is argued that these countries are repressive societies, and
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-24what has happened there does not apply to United States and similar more progressive
countries,146 i.e., countries with a liberal tradition147 The likelihood that officials in the United
States would turn hate speech laws into weapons against minorities seems remote.148
D. Censorship?
Fear of governmental censorship is another prominent civil libertarian argument against hate
speech regulation. On the specific level, with respect to on-campus prohibition of face-to-face
racial slurs advocated by egalitarians, what does on-campus mean? Is an epithet shouted at
several African-Americans from twenty feet away “face-to-face?” Is water buffalo, honkey, or
dumb baboon a racial slur?149 But the argument concerns itself much more with the more general
implication of hate speech rules: if hate speech is regulated, a precedent is set for other types of
speech regulation, so there is a potential danger for the speech of all dissenters.150 Why? Because
hate speech regulation is content-based and content is not a good basis to distinguish good ideas
from bad ones, if it is any basis at all. So, the government is put into a censorship business and
there is no means to ensure that the government will not grab the power to inhibit speech,
especially dissenting speech, for example, criticism of governmental policies.151 In a word, we
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consensus at any particular historical moment and repress all speech that is seriously inconsistent with, or regresses
from, that viewpoint, then we will curtail revolutionary possibilities”); and Robert W. McGee, Hate Speech, Free
Speech and the University, 24 AKRON L. REV. 363, 390 (1990) (noting that restricting speech threatens to entrench
the power of governing elites).

-25will be on a slippery slope, knowing not where we can stop.152 If hate speech (fact-to-face or not)
is bridled, will we not soon find ourselves tolerating restrictions on classroom speech or political
satire in the school newspaper? 153 If we permit our fragile web of speech protection to suffer one
dent, might not others soon follow?154 How can we be assured that the judge or administrator
will not impose his or her notion of political orthodoxy on us?155 Therefore, true, hate speech is
offensive, but this is not a sound reason for regulation, other forms of speech, especially
dissenting speech, are offensive. There is no genuine distinction between hate speech and, for
example, Marxist speech156 or feminist speech.157
Some egalitarians have their reply ready at hand. As to the specific problems surrounding
campus hate speech rules, it is admitted that they are indeed difficulties.158 Nonetheless, it is
argued, please have a look at other doctrines that limit speech we do not like, such as libel,
defamation, plagiarism, copyright, threat, and so on.159 These doctrines have the same problem;
for example, it can be easily pointed out what a clear-cut case of plagiarism looks like, but at the
margin it is less sure. We have long accepted these doctrines,160 then why should we, while
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-26accepting them, resist hate speech rules which are no different from them?161 To the general
implication of hate speech rules worried about by civil libertarian – that hate speech rules
constitute a precedent that can be used to restrict other types of speech,162 such as, the Marxist
speech163 and that government censorship will follow164 – there is also a ready reply. It is pointed
out that harms felt by hate speech victims, mainly minorities, are different from harms felt by
people disliking, for example, Marxist speech. Hate speeches are based on a history of slavery or
being treated unequally. For example, the African Americans once were considered as
commodities instead of equal human beings;165 women were long denied suffrage;166 and so on.
With this long and rich historical background, hate speech is especially hurtful to the minorities.
And on this historical basis, hate speech can be distinguished from other types of should-not-beregulated speech, even if people find them offensive or harmful, and Marxist speech is one of
these should-not-be-regulated types. Still on this historical basis, it is even argued that, hate
speech by minorities targeting the white majority are less harmful than hate speech the opposite
way,167 since the white majority does not have a history of being slaved or unequally treated. In
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-27addition, even if the slippery slope argument has its merits, it does not mean that it shall be
accepted automatically. To accept it, an assessment that the dangers of slipping are greater than
the dangers of treating racist speech with impunity must be made.168
As to the Marxist speech specifically proffered by civil libertarians, some egalitarians have a
reply.169 This important difference comes from human experience – our only source of collective
knowledge, from which we all know that slavery is wrong.170 This knowledge is reflected in the
universal acceptance of the wrongness of the doctrine of racial supremacy.171 There is no nation
left on this planet officially claims that that Hitler was right.172 Even South Africa, when it is
ruled by the white minority by an official policy of apartheid on the basis of white supremacy,
tried painstakingly to avoid an explicit ideology of racial supremacy by using the rhetoric of onestep-at-a-time. 173 The universal acceptance of the principle is a mark of collective human
progress, which is unique, since this is a world bereft of agreement on many things.174 On the
other hand, Marxist speech is not universally condemned. Many nations adhere to Marxist
ideology, and it is impossible to achieve world consensus either for or against this view. 175
Marxism is a philosophy for political organization, distribution of wealth and power, ordering of
values, and promotion of social change. So, by its very content, it is political speech going to the
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-28core of ongoing political debate. While Marxist ideas are rejected and abhorred by many,
Marxist thought, like liberal thought, neoconservative economic theory, and other conflicting
structures for understanding life and politics, is part of the ongoing efforts of human beings to
understand their world and improve life in it.176
E. Aberration/Minimal?
The arguments that hate speech is aberration and isolated and its harm is minimal is basically
an assertion, without supporting statistics or other evidence. For example, it is mentioned that
American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) President Nadine Strossen made a remark at ACLU
biennial conference plenary session that hate speech’s harm is minimal. 177 A Stanford law
professor was said to have interpreted a poster defacement incident178 in Stanford as the behavior
of two rather isolated, ignorant, and misguided youths.179 To these assertions, if they are just
assertions, perhaps the egalitarians would have not taken too much issue with them. But the true
point is, behind the civil libertarians’ arguments against hate speech regulation lie such attitudes.
If not so, if civil libertarians also thought hate speech has great harm and is widespread, how
would they argue against regulation? Anyway, these are not just simple assertions, but behind the
scene attitudes that need to be addressed seriously. So, the egalitarians have taken great pains to
point out that, as discussed above, hate speech is not sporadic or infrequent but widespread.180
They have further pointed out that, as also discussed above, harm to minorities is not just any
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-29harm, but very deep and unique harm, especially when the historical background of slavery or
inequality is fully taken into account.181 Besides, not just minorities (often as victims of hate
speech) are deeply harmed, the majority (more possible to be perpetrators) is harmed also, and in
the end, the whole society is harmed.182
F. Pressure Valve?
The so-called pressure valve argument holds that hate speech prohibition rules increase the
danger racism poses to minorities,183 for forcing racists to bottle up their dislike of minorities
means that they will be more likely to say or do something hurtful later. With free speech, racists
utter their racist remarks, thus allowing tension to dissipate before it reaches a dangerous level.184
Therefore, free speech functions as a pressure valve.185 The egalitarians do not agree. They say
the case is quite the contrary.186 There is psychological evidence indicating that permitting one to
say or do hateful things to another increases rather than decreases the chance that one will do so
again in the future.187 Besides, others may follow suit since they may believe that hateful speech
is permissible.188 And the metaphor of pressure valve is really misleading. Human behaviors are
more complex than the laws of physics that describe pressure valves, tanks and the behavior of a
gas or liquid in a tube. 189 People use words to construct categories for “black,” “woman,”
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-30“child”, “criminal”, “wartime enemy” and so on. 190 These categories govern the way people
speak of and act toward members of those categories. 191 Social science studies support this
argument. These studies include an Iowa teacher’s “blue eyes/brown eyes” experiment showing
even one-day assignment of stigma can change behavior and school performance,192 a Stanford
experiment assigning students roles of prisoner and prison guard,193 an interview study about
male sexual offenders, and another experiment where one subject administers en electric shock
to another when the latter misses a question asked by an authority figure.194 These studies all
show that allowing people to stigmatize or revile others makes them more aggressive, not less
so.195 In a word, “pressure valves may be safer after letting off steam, human beings are not.”196
G. Should Not Be Driven Underground?
It is argued by Stephen Carter that regulating racist speech will leave minorities little better
off than they are now, while screening out hard truths about the way many white people look at
minorities.197 This argument is echoed by sothers when they point out that hate-speech crusaders
miss a valuable opportunity to consider the problems of the affirmative action, 198 or that
antiracism rules have forfeited communities an opportunity to attack racism since they have
swept racism “under the rug”.199 When the problem is under the rug, people do not know who
are racists or who are not, and the racist unknown is more dangerous than the racist known.

190

Id.
Id., at 878-79.
192
Id., at 879.
193
Id.
194
Id., at 879-80.
195
Id., at 880.
196
Id.
197
Stephen Carter, REFLECTIONS OF AN AFFIRMATIVE ACTION BABY 177, 179 (Basic Books, 1992).
198
Dinesh D’Souza, ILLIBERAL EDUCATION: THE POLITICS OF RACE AND S EX ON CAMPUS 231-42 (1991) (suggesting
that special programs and codes are necessary because affirmative action has failed or has been overly ambitious).
199
Vince Herron, Note, Increasing the Speech: Diversity, Campus Speech Codes, and the Pursuit of Truth, 67 S.
CAL. L. REV. 407, 424 (1994).
191

-31To these arguments, it is admitted that there is one valid point: the known racist is less
dangerous than the unknown one.200 Nonetheless, an alternative value is ignored by the civil
libertarians: the possibility that the racist will be cured or at least deterred by official rules and
policies from exhibiting the behavior.201 But at the same time, the community has not forfeited
an opportunity to discuss and analyze the problem, since “even the best-drafted rules will not
suppress hate speech entirely; there will continue to be some incidents of racist speech and
behavior.”202 In a word, hate speech rules do not sweep the problem completely under the rug,
though they do decrease hate speech incidents.203 It seems that it is argued that while hate speech
rules have the benefit of deterring hate speech, they still give the community an opportunity to
face the problem, so they are desirable from whatever perspective.
H. Victimization?
The next argument, i.e., the victimization one, argues that hate speech rules will encourage
minorities to see themselves as victims.204 The idea is, with hate speech rules in place, minorities
will tend to rush to authorities every time something wounds their feelings, thus ignoring that
they could either speak back or just ignore the offensive words.205 In other words, a “crybaby”
attitude will be encouraged.206 It is warned that these rules will end up reinforcing a system of
supplication and self-abasement;
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interracial friendship will be prevented;
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and a

“therapeutic” mentality and an excessive occupation with feelings will be reinforced.209
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-32To these points, it is replied that, hate speech rules will definitely have no such bad
victimization effect. For sure, there are the rules, but minorities are not required to file a
complaint whenever they are targeted by verbal abuse,210 so alternatives still exist as they do
before. Minorities can still talk back or ignore hate speech.211 Hate speech rules simply provide
one more avenue of recourse for those who wish to take advantage of them.212 Besides, even
filing a complaint might be considered one way of taking charge of one’s destiny: one is active,
instead of passively endure invectives.213 Still, why don’t we raise “victimization” as a reason
against complaint filing rules when a car is stolen or a house is burglarized?214 And why don’t
we encourage people to just rise above it or talk back to their victimizer when their car is stolen
or their house is burglarized?215
I. Differential Effect?
This argument is concerned with equal treatment of hate speech speakers. It is argued that
hate speech rules will have differential effects on ignorant or blue-collar students on the one
hand, and richer and refined students on the other hand. Someone gives examples of more
refined hate speech and more crude hate speech. The cruder one is: “Out of my face, jungle
bunny.”216 And the more refined one is: “LeVon, if you find yourself struggling in your classes
here, you should realize it isn’t your fault. It’s simply that you’re the beneficiary of a disruptive
policy of affirmative action that places underqualified, underprepared and often undertalented
black students in demanding educational environments like this one. The policy’s egalitarian
208
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-33aims may be well-intentioned, but given the fact that aptitude tests place African Americans
almost a full standard deviation below the mean, even controlling for socioeconomic disparities,
they are also profoundly misguided. The truth is, you probably don’t belong here, and your
college experience will be a long downhill slide.”217
To this, it is replied that this argument is “plainly wrong”,218 since both blue-collar and upperclass members of the community will be prohibited from uttering crude racial slurs and
epithets.219 “N, go home; you don’t belong at this university”, a crude hate speech, no matter if it
is spoken by the billionaire’s son or the coal miner’s daughter, is prohibited by hate speech
rules.220 And if students from richer and upper classes are really less likely to say this kind of
words, and more likely to utter only intellectualized versions like the one above, then this may
because they are less racist in a raw sense.221 And this is supported by many social scientists’
belief that prejudice tends to be inversely correlated with educational level and social position,
and the wealthy and well educated may well violate hate-speech rules less often than others
do.222 Besides, “Out of my face, jungle bunny” is a more serious case of hate speech because (1)
it is not open to argument or a more-speech response; and (2) it bears overtones of a direct
physical threat, while the more refined example, “deplorable as it is, is answerable by more
speech and contains no element of threat.” 223 In a word, it seems that it is argued that this
difference warrants differential treatment, if one feels compelled to argue that hate speech rules
have a differential effect at all.
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-34J. Waste of Time/Resources?
Now, we come to the waste-of-time/resources argument. It is urged, for example, that civil
rights leaders have better things to do. To concentrate on hate speech rules is myopic and is to
benefit only a small number of minority persons, 224 and can only bring about symbolic
benefits.225 So efforts to regulate hate speech would be quixotic or disingenuous.226 Instead of
“picking relatively small fights of their own convenience,” they should examine true obstacles
impeding racial progress. 227 Why, it is wondered, has this small problem attracted so much
attention when there is more serious work to do?228
It is counterargued that the waste-of-time arguer may have neglected that eliminating hate
speech goes hand in hand with combating so-called “real racism.”229 True, victimization by hate
speech is a less serious misfortune than other forms of victimization, for example, of denial of a
job, a mortgage, or an educational opportunity. But what is equally true is “that a society that
speaks and thinks of minorities disparagingly is tolerating an environment in which these more
active forms of discrimination will occur frequently.” 230 Hate speech, acting in concert with
floods of media imagery, constructs and reinforces a stereotypical picture of minorities in the
mind of the public: minorities are happy and carefree, oversexed, criminal, treacherous,
untrustworthy, immoral, stupid, and so on.231 These stereotypes, it is argued, account for much
misery in the lives of persons of color. For example, motorists will fail to stop to aid a stranded
black driver, police officers will roust African-American youths innocently walking or talking to
223
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-35each other on the streets, and landlords will act on unarticulated feelings in renting an apartment
to a white over an equally qualified black or Mexican.232 Once minorities of color are rendered
one-down in the minds of others, the chances are that they will be more frequently victimized by
so-called real discrimination.233 Furthermore, as civil libertarians and many whites would think,
acts of out-and-out discrimination are rare, and today racism tends to be subtle, lying in the arena
of unarticulated feelings, practices, and patterns of behavior on the part of institutions and
individuals.234 It is hard to deal with this subtle form of racism. But it happens that thought and
language are closely connected: our choice of word, metaphor, or image betrays the attitude we
have about a person or subject.235 So, there is no better tool than a focus on language to deal with
this form of subtle racism.236 When civil libertarians are among those leading proponents of this
idea of subtle racism, it is strange that they argue against the best tool to crack down on it.237
Further, with harms of hate speech so great and unique,238 it is strange to say that hate speech
rules can only bring about symbolic values. Laws and rules affect people’s behavior. In a setting
where minorities are thought and spoken of respectfully, few acts of out-and-out discrimination
would occur, and hate speech rules contribute to such a setting.239
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CHAPTER IV
EVALUATION: INTERNAL CRITIQUE OF EGALITARIAN ARGUMENTS
Based on Parts II and III, this part tries to do an internal critique of egalitarian arguments, as
an effort to evaluate the debate between egalitarians and civil libertarians. But first a word about
what “internal critique” means is necessary. As an evaluation tool used here, it roughly means to
examine how well the egalitarian arguments for hate speech regulation are supported by the
evidence and logic said to underlie them, even while assuming they are plausibly right in
contending that hate speech should be regulated. If the evidence and reasoning are marked by
defects and incoherencies, or are unsound or unsustainable, then the egalitarian case for hate
speech regulation will collapse.
A. Critique of the Utilization of Social Science Studies
Several social science studies240 are heavily relied upon by some egalitarians to argue that
hate speech inflicts great harms on the victim. This subsection criticizes the utilization of social
science studies by arguing that these studies do not support relevant arguments well. The point
made here is not that social science studies should never be relied upon, but that when they are
used to support an argument or position, careful analysis would be undoubtedly necessary. One
should ask at least whether or not the relevant study pertains to one’s argument, and one should
also be concerned the probability that the study could be used to undermine one’s argument and
reasoning. This undermining could be in a direct way, that is, the study could be asserted to have
240
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-37contradicted the very argument it is supposed to support. This undermining could also be in an
indirect way, that is, though not directly contradictory to the argument or assertion, the study
simply does not support the argument or assertion. The problem with social studies used by
egalitarians to support their arguments belongs to the second type.
Take the blood pressure study241 first. In that study, it is stated that American blacks have
higher blood pressure levels than their white counterparts.242 And since there is evidence that
high blood pressure is associated with inhibited, constrained, or restricted anger, and not with
genetic factors,243 this study is argued to be evidence that hate speech, as part of racism, has bad
physical consequences on minorities.244 Even if we do not take issue with the genetic factors, this
higher blood pressure could well be explained other ways. Perhaps it is due to the fact that AfroAmericans generally are poorer than whites, so their diet is not healthy, or not as healthy as that
of whites; perhaps this is due to the fact that they lead life styles different from those of whites;
perhaps it is because of their living environment is not as healthy as whites, and so on. These
other explanations, if not well dispelled, cast much doubt on the study’s utility as evidence of
hate speech’s physical harms.
Similar problems mark the experiment used to support the idea that hate speech will adversely
affect minorities’ pecuniary interest. That experiment allegedly put blacks and whites “of similar
aptitudes and capacities” into a competitive situation, 245 and it was found that the blacks
exhibited defeatism, half-hearted competitiveness and high expectancies of failure. 246 So, the
assertion is, psychological harms caused by racism will severely handicap minorities’ pursuit of
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-38a career.247 Let’s say this assertion is right, since it is perhaps readily acceptable that timid,
withdrawn, bitter, hypertense, or psychotic persons will most probably fare poorly in
employment settings. 248 But as with the higher blood pressure study, the results of this
experiment are also susceptible of other explanations. For example, the very fact that the black
persons exhibited defeatism and so on undermines the assumption that they are comparable to
whites in their aptitudes and capacities. Perhaps it happened that the black persons chosen by the
experimenter were somewhat defeatists. If some other black persons had been chosen, the result
perhaps would have been very different. These other black persons perhaps would have exhibited
an aspiring spirit comparable to or even stronger than that of their white counterparts. In a word,
this experiment, if it says something, at most says that there are defeatist black persons. And if
this experiment and its result are not repeated in enough quantities, the experiment hardly says
more.
Similarly, social studies used to support the assertion that racism and racial labeling have
even greater impact on children249 are also susceptible of other explanations not related to racism
or hate speech. For example, the black child’s preference of light-skinned dolls over darkskinned otherwise identical ones because he thought dark-skinned ones looked dirty or “not
nice” could be contributed to the fact that that when something is dirty, it tends to be black250 and
he, like other children, is constantly warned by parents to stay away from such dirty, and black,
things and thus begins to associate black with dirty. So, chances are great that he associates black
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-39with dirtiness on the basis of these daily exposure to dirty things, not due to racism or hate
speech.251
B. Critique of the Resort to the International Trend
The international trend, as argued by egalitarians, bears heavily on hate speech regulation in
United States.252 They have resorted to international treaties, most prominently Article 4 of the
International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination.253 The most
relevant provisions are its preamble and section (a).254 Egalitarians have also resorted to other
countries’ hate speech regulations.255 We shall turn to the international treaty first, and then to
other countries’ hate speech regulation experience.
1. Article 4
Article 4’s preamble says, “States Parties condemn all propaganda and all organizations
which are based on ideas or theories of superiority of one race or group of persons of one colour
or ethnic origin, or which attempt to justify or promote racial hatred and discrimination in any
form, and undertake to adopt immediate and positive measures designed to eradicate all
incitement to, or acts of, such discrimination…” 256 Its language emphasizes hate speech
propaganda and hate speech organizations doing such propaganda.
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-40Section (a) of Article 4 requires state parties to punish “all dissemination of ideas based on
racial superiority or hatred…”257 Here, what is prohibited is “dissemination.” So the question one
needs to ask is that what constitutes “propaganda” or “dissemination.” To answer this question, it
is necessary to bear in mind that egalitarians are arguing for regulation of face-to-face hate
speech in informal settings,258 for example, “N, go back to Africa, you do not belong here” said
by a white student to a black student on campus in informal settings.259 But the problem is, does
face-to-face hate speech constitute propaganda? Dissemination? Quite doubtful, not to mention
that such speech does not come from hate speech organizations. In a word, careful examination
of Article 4 indicates that it is intended to condemn systematic efforts of humiliating people, not
just any hate speech uttered by private citizens. The Article most probably prohibits hate speech
publications, broadcasting, and other hate speech forms of widespread significance, and, when
section (b) 260 is taken into account, hate speech organizations. So, a student distributing
pamphlets advocating racism261 and the National Socialist Party in Village of Skokie v. National
Socialist Party262 are well covered by the international treaty,263 but slurs like “N, go back to
Africa, you do not belong here” are not, especially if they are uttered by ordinary, private
citizens in informal settings, i.e., face-to-face settings.264
In summary, while Article 4 does support some regulation of hate speech, it does not support
the comprehensive hate speech regulation (which includes face-to-face hate speech regulation)
advocated by many egalitarians.
257
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-412. Other Western Countries’ Experience
There are two problems with the egalitarian resort to other western countries’ experience.
First, it seems that those countries’ experience does not support the comprehensive hate speech
regulation advocated by many egalitarians. Let’s use as an example Britain’s Race Relations Act,
which is emphasized by several egalitarians. 265 The Act, as enacted in 1965, created a new
offense for persons who “with intent to stir up hatred against any section of the public …
distinguished by colour, race or ethnic or national origins … publish [] or distribute [] written
matter which is threatening, abusive or insulting; or … use [] in any public place or at any public
meeting words which are threatening, abusive or insulting, being matter or words likely to stir up
hatred…”266 In 1976, realizing that the intent requirement made prosecution especially difficult
and rare, the intent requirement was abolished.267 Further, in 1986, the Act was amended again to
permit a constable to arrest without a warrant “anyone he reasonably suspects is committing an
offense under this section.”268 But does the Act really support the egalitarian case for face-toface hate speech regulation? Again, it is quite doubtful. It must be noted that this Act, as
described above, emphasizes “publication” or “distribution,” not just any private hate speech in a
face-to-face situation. As to the prohibition of such language in public places, egalitarians seem
to forget that, even after the intent requirement was abolished, the standard of “likely to stir up
hatred” is not abandoned. What does this mean? Besides, what constitutes “use in public
places?” Does “N, go back to Africa, you do not belong here” uttered face-to-face by a white
student to a black student in a low voice constitute “use in public place?” What if it is uttered in a
loud voice in a public place, but there are no other people except themselves? Even if there are
264
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-42other people present, is the standard “likely to stir up hatred” automatically met? Is the fact that
the black student is angered sufficient to meet the standard? 269 These questions are not
necessarily extreme and unfair, since they pertain to the extent to which the British experience
supports the egalitarian case for hate speech regulation, especially face-to-face hate speech
regulation. To answer them and ascertain the pertinence, England courts’ interpretation needs to
be looked into, since Britain has an established long tradition of judge-made law. Without such
an examination, it would be too hasty to draw conclusions based solely on the provision itself.
Here, for the purpose of this paper, it is not necessary to look into the specific cases. It suffices to
say that, there is at least some possibility that British courts would interpret these statutes very
narrowly. If so, it would be hard to say that the British Act supports egalitarians’ arguments.270
Their resort to several other countries’ experience is similarly problematic.271
Second, those countries’ experience is simply not enough to establish that free speech will not
be impeded by hate speech regulation. For example, in Britain, under the Race Relations Act of
1965, there were several important safeguards to protect free speech, 272 and there were few
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-43prosecutions.273 Even the Race Relations Act of 1986 is ineffective in carrying out its purported
task of hate speech prosecution,274 and the court has tried to interpret the act narrowly. 275 In
Canada, each hate speech offense is subject to a number of defenses,276 and hate speech rules are
applied sparingly.277 In another word, hate speech regulation in those countries278 is not in its full
swing, or is not allowed to be in its full swing. 279 With prosecution rare, those countries’
experience simply does not furnish adequate evidence to establish that hate speech regulation
will not inhibit free speech.
In addition, one might want to ask questions like “Why are there often various safeguards?”
“Why are there often very few prosecutions?” and so on. The answer to these questions is: there
is at least some possibility that authorities in those countries are reluctant to seriously carry out
their hate speech laws. If one day, in times of stress, they begin to take them seriously enough,
we can wait and see what will happen. So, I would rather find in those countries’ experience a
kind of reluctance rather than a willingness or trend to regulate hate speech. And this reluctance
casts much doubt on the assertion that there is an international trend toward hate speech
regulation.
C. Critique of Scope, Severity and Uniqueness of Hate Speech
What is discussed in this subsection, to put it in a way consistent with the concept of internal
critique as defined in this paper, is the following question: How well the evidence supports the
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-44assertions that hate speech is widespread and that it causes severe and unique harms? One by
one, arguments that hate speech is widespread, hate speech has severe harms, and these harms
are unique are called into doubt.
1. Is Hate Speech Widespread?
The 1990 report of the National Institute Against Prejudice and Violence is relied upon by
several egalitarians280 to argue that hate speech is widespread on campus. The report said that
since the fall of 1986, more than 250 college campuses have experienced racial ethnoviolence.281
It also estimated that between 800,000 and one million students annually were involved in these
incidents, 282 and that approximately twenty percent of minority students experienced some form
of ethnic or racial attack during an academic year and that one-fourth were victimized more than
once.283 So, it seems that there is a pretty severe situation to worry about. Nonetheless, this report
does not necessarily support egalitarian arguments that the situation is bad enough to warrant
hate speech regulation. Problems begin with the definition of “ethnoviolence” in that report.
“Ethnoviolence” means “an act or an attempted act which is motivated by group prejudice and
intended to cause physical or psychological injury. These violent acts include intimidation,
harassment, group insults, property defacement or destruction, and physical attacks.”284 Could
intimidation, harassment, group insults, property defacement or destruction and physical attacks
all be characterized as hate speech? If the distinction of speech and conduct is completely
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-45erased, 285 surely they could all be so characterized. But if due regard is accorded to the
distinction,286 then we will be left with “intimidation,” “harassment” and “group insults” being
cases of hate speech. So, the scope of hate speech is considerably narrowed. Besides, there is
another point that needs to be made: how is it determined that relevant acts are motivated by
group prejudice? It is hard without voluntary confession of people engaging in ethnoviolence.
So, the statistics that there are so many incidents of ethnoviolence are called into doubt. These
statistics perhaps at least partly came from this method: whenever some act involves two
different groups, the act is generally treated as a case of ethnoviolence, and the group prejudice
motivation is assumed. But it is well possible that many of these ethnoviolent incidents are not
motivated by group prejudice at all. Here, a further fine distinction needs to be made between an
incident motivated by group prejudice and an incident where group prejudice is displayed. For
example, when a white student physically attacks a black person on some other ground287 than
hatred of black people, but he leaves behind a message on the wall saying “you black stupid, stay
at your home, don’t hang around,” then this would most probably be wrongly characterized an
incident of ethnoviolence. So, the report perhaps has a problem of over-inclusiveness. On these
two counts, the report’s utility of supporting egalitarian assertion is quite diminished.
Further points could be made with respect to this report. As we recall, the report estimated
that between 800,000 and one million students annually were involved in ethnoviolent
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-46incidents;288 approximately twenty percent of minority students experienced some form of ethnic
or racial attack during an academic year; and, one-fourth were victimized more than once.289 But
this does not establish that ethnoviolence or hate speech is a severe problem, since generally
statistics necessarily conceal or ignore something significant in evaluating the situation: the
severity of relevant incidents. If most of the incidents are not severe or even trivial, then these
statistics do not say too much, at least not as much as egalitarians have claimed.290
2. Are Harms of Hate Speech Severe?
With the “widespread” issue called into question, the argument that harms of hate speech is
severe is called into doubt in the sense that on the general level, if not on the individual level,
harms of hate speech are not severe. But this does not dispel that specific individuals subject to
hate speech would be harmed severely. Nonetheless, I will argue that harms of hate speech on
individuals are not as severe as is claimed by egalitarians. Recall that as relevant social science
studies about the physical and pecuniary harms of hate speech are called into doubt, 291 the
asserted severity is much diminished. Besides, even if arguments that hate speech does have such
physical and pecuniary harms are sound, one would still have to ask to what extent they are
valid. Here, it should not be forgotten that relational, physical and pecuniary harms are based on
the theory of social construction of reality, which is based on one’s frequent exposure to hate
speech. 292 And if people are just occasionally subject to hate speech, 293 it would stretch the
argument too much to say that most victims will suffer relationally, physically and pecuniarily.
288
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-47Further, it is similarly strenuous to use these harms to argue that hate speech needs to be
regulated. One hypothetical situation is enough to clarify this point. Suppose one day morning, a
minority student met a white law professor. The student said hello or good morning to the
professor, who did not reply for whatever reason. Then the minority student wondered why, and
continued to walk. Because he was absent-minded, he did not pay due attention to traffic on the
road, and was hit and severely injured by a car. It happened that the person drove the car without
a license. So the person was put into jail. And it happened that he drove the car of his older
brother, the true owner, who, with knowledge that his younger brother did not have a driver’s
license, very reluctantly yielded to his pleading of “just one time.” So, with the accident, the
older brother was heavily fined, and then … Undoubtedly, the chains of cause and effect are
simply limitless. If one likes it, one can go on and on. The point is, whatever the physical and
pecuniary harms of hate speech are, they simply should not have been relied upon, at least should
not have been relied upon too much, to support the argument that hate speech should be
regulated.294
3. Are Harms of Hate Speech Unique?
History is heavily relied upon to argue that harms of hate speech are unique. For example, it is
argued that hate speech by a white person to a black person is much more severe than hate
speech vice versa.295 The idea is, whites were not subjected to slavery as blacks were; when a
black person is racially insulted, the whole history of slavery comes into play. Accordingly,
some egalitarians go further to argue that hate speech by black persons or minorities to whites
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-48should be regulated while hate speech the opposite way can be left without regulation,296 though
in the wake of several court decisions striking down hate speech regulations, for example, Doe v.
University of Michigan,297 they reconsidered their positions to argue for regulation of hate speech
of both types, but only in an effort to save hate speech rules previously targeting the white-toblack/minorities hate speech.298
This reliance on history, in my view, is quite problematic. True, there is a history of enslaving
black people and a history of denial of suffrage to women that most people (excluding white
supremacists and male supremacists) deeply and sincerely regret. This history truly makes hate
speech by whites to blacks or by men to women much more hurtful than otherwise. But when
one resorts to history, one need to remember that history is not everything, and perhaps is not
most of the thing. The further time elapses, the weaker the method of relying on history will be,
because things are changing fast; and one day people would even find it difficult to understand
that history. Today black people have no personal experience with slave history, and women
have no personal experience of suffrage denial either. Though nowadays they are not far from
discrimination, they are really far from that historical background. Thus, it would be a little
tricky to argue that historical background adds more stings into white-to-black or men-to-women
hate speech. People are living in this world, not in that older historical one. What makes hate
speech more hurtful to them is that today they are unduly denied many social benefits, they are
looked down on by others, they are much poorer than others, and so on, not that deeplyregrettable history. Suppose that the passage of time had ended with every vestige of inequality,
whites suddenly did not hold any idea of inferiority of black persons, and men suddenly did not
hold any idea of inferiority of women, and all the people suddenly had become truly equal in
296
297
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-49whatever terms,299 and people ever since had not experienced any discrimination, no matter how
trivial; for what reason would a long-since-past historical background matter? If one still wants
to argue that history matters, then what matters is a continuous history, not just that still
historical background; what matters is personal history, not just that big, general history. But
when one really so argues, one is actually arguing that it is actual living experience and not
history that matters in evaluating hate speech and its arguably unique harms.300
The point that actual living experience matters much more than history in evaluating hate
speech leads us to another distinction made by egalitarians in their effort to argue that harms of
hate speech are unique: hate speech based on race, sex or other unalterable personal
characteristics is more harmful than “hate speech” based on alterable characteristics, such as
poverty.301 But is race, sex or other so-called unalterable characteristics so different from poverty
as to the point that it is not inconsistent when hate speech is regulated while disparaging speech
targeting the poor is not? If one accepts that personal experience rather than the historical
background matters most in evaluating this question, then one would doubt this distinction made
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-50by egalitarians. True, poor people can change their economic situation. But how easily? To what
degree? Generally speaking, the poor tend to be poorer and the rich richer over time, since the
poor have few resources to resort to tilt the scale, and some bad luck would suddenly and
completely ruin them,302 while the rich have more resources to utilize to further their interests,
and are more able to afford bad luck. It is enough to just think about a poor illiterate couple who
are unable to support their children’s education. The parents generally cannot get good, well-paid
jobs and thus earn just a bare living. The children, since their parents are unable to support their
education, will be most probably in the same abysmal position. Since they are doing low-level
menial jobs, in their daily life, they have a great possibility of being discriminated against and
insulted by others on the basis of their poverty. And because they are illiterate, their chance of
advance in the social strata would be dim, and poverty perhaps would accompany them for a
whole life, as would discrimination and insults. So, for what reason that while disparaging words
targeting them on the basis of their poverty not be prohibited while hate speech based on race,
sex or other so-called unalterable personal characteristics is prohibited by law, when it seems
that poverty tends to accompany one a whole life and not as alterable as appears? Egalitarians are
arguing that the victim’s story needs to be considered 303 and if it is duly considered by civil
libertarians, they would not object to hate speech regulation. Here, I ask egalitarians to consider a
poor child’s story. I am from a very poor family. My parents were and are still very poor. I
remember that when I was young, in some years, we would often have no money to buy rice. So,
now and then we were just eating sweet potatoes, nothing else. Without money, my brothers and
I wore worn-out clothes. We were scorned by others, and I was even called “Rags” in the
elementary school since I often wore old clothes. That epithet, even today, stings at me very
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-51strongly, even when it is used by someone on the road to a beggar. Not only that epithet. Other
similar words or even just disparaging attitudes displayed by others make me feel bad and
humiliated, thinking back to my early living experience as a poor child.304
This personal story that I am at a great reluctance to tell exemplifies two points. First, poverty
is not as easily overcome as suggested by egalitarians. Often poverty accompanies one a whole
life, just as it accompanied my parents throughout their lives. Second, stigmatization (verbal or
not) based on poverty tends to have strong and long-lasting psychological effects on the victim;
not only racial humiliation305 tends to have such effects. Besides, while poverty is not easy to
overcome, some so-called unalterable personal characteristics, e.g. sex, are not so hard to
overcome. Today, with new medical technology, sex is not unalterable in an ordinary sense, if
one is willing to go through surgery. In today’s world, transsexuals are no longer an uncommon
phenomenon. So, the argument that the difference between race, sex or other unalterable
characteristics and poverty warrants that hate speech needs to be regulated while verbal insults
on the basis of poverty can be left without regulation is not a sound one.306
Furthermore, even if we admit that there is true and stark difference between poverty and race
or sex, there is still a problem when it comes to hate speech based on religion. Is there true
difference between poverty and religion with respect to hate speech regulation? Theoretically,
both can be changed. One can renounce one’s former religion and convert into a new one that
would not invite hate speech based on religion. True, to change religion is hard, since religion
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-52often is assumed with birth. But to change one’s economic status, as is shown above, is not so
easy either, and poverty also often comes with birth and accompanies one for a whole life.
The point here is that arguments alleging the uniqueness of harms of hate speech are not very
soundly supported, and that it is grossly problematic to emphasize history as the basis for treating
hate speech differently from other types of disparaging speech based on, for example, poverty.
What matters more, and most, is not a general historical background, but one’s actual living
experience.307 If egalitarians want to challenge this point, they would have to renounce their
reliance on the social construction of reality theory308 they have heavily relied upon to assert that
hate speech, even in the absence of real racism, causes great harms to minorities.309 Just look at
what is quoted to support the assertion that hate speech has great adverse impacts on the victim:
“Human beings . . . whose daily experience tells them that almost nowhere in society are they
respected and granted the ordinary dignity and courtesy accorded to others will, as a matter of
course, begin to doubt their own worth.”310 Obviously the speaker is talking about one’s daily
experience. Thus, when it comes to uniqueness of such harms, it looks quite strange and
inconsistent that historical background rather than daily experience is emphasized.311
D. Critique of Political Imperativeness and Legal Commitment
1. The Political Imperativeness Argument: Not Well Documented
To the egalitarian argument that hate speech is no longer a social good,312 some criticism for
the sake of internal critique can be made. Recall that one of the supporting arguments is the
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-53American society has become more diverse. In response, one might ask “compared to what
period, the fifties, sixties, seventies, or eighties?” “to what extent?” and “is the extent great
enough to support the position that hate speech is no longer a social good?”313 and so on. If these
questions are not clearly answered, there is at least reason to doubt whether the greater diversity
in the American society supports the political imperativeness argument; or put it specifically,
whether the greater diversity warrants hate speech regulation as argued by egalitarians.314 With
regard to another supporting argument that in a democratic society deliberation among equals is
the keystone, 315 while hate speech denigrates minority groups needlessly, making people
unequal, so that desired deliberation is impeded316 if not made impossible,317 – it needs to point
out that occasional, face-to-face hate speech in informal settings does not make people
unequal.318 Only frequent hate speech constituting a hostile environment319 would have such an
effect. So this evidence does not support face-to-face regulation much. Besides, “deliberation
among equals” does not require that a private citizen treat another respectfully or equally in
informal settings as much as it requires that governments give all private citizens equal access to
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Let’s assume that Mr. Richard Delgado is right in saying hate speech perhaps was a social good before.
Besides, as discussed above, see Part II (A) above (where a concise treatment of the theory of social construction
can be found) and Part IV (C) (1) above (which challenges the egalitarian argument that hate speech is widespread),
to prevent people from contributing and participating actively, hate speech needs to be frequent, or at least no
occasional. Otherwise, hate speech is no different from calling somebody “stupid.” So the political imperativeness
diminishes further if the criticism of the uniqueness of harms of hate speech in Part IV (C) (3) above is taken into
consideration. Here it is worth noting that I am not arguing hate speech is a social good, but that the argument that it
is no longer a social good is not well documented.
315
Richard Delgado, Book Review, supra note 20, at 796.
316
Id., at 796-97, where it is argued that without regulation of hate speech, genuine dialogue based on equal
participation and respect will be scarce.
317
Id.
318
Suppose in a black person’s whole life, only one day did a white person say something tantamount to hate speech
to him or her, he or she is not made unequal. Of course, this is an extreme situation, but it does reveals that the
“deliberation among equals” does not support face-to-face hate speech well, at least when such hate speech does not
constitute a hostile environment.
319
Where the theory of social construction of reality can come into play. Here some further criticism can still be
made. Suppose in a relatively closed community, a person is frequently subject to hate speech by and only by
another one, while the person is respectful and equally treated by all others, there is doubt that a hostile environment
could be found in this circumstance. So what is required is not only frequent hate speech, but frequent hate speech
from different persons, at least two different persons.
314

-54political arena.320 So, hate speech, at least when it does not come from the government or other
forms of organized authorities,321 does not have much to do with “deliberation among equals.”
For example, the fact that one white person322 holds the idea that blacks should not be accorded
equal citizenship and often calls blacks disparagingly does not prevent blacks to be equal
citizens, when they are accorded equal citizenship by the government. So even if “deliberation
among equals” is the keystone of modern democracy, it does not help the egalitarian case for
hate speech regulation much.
2. The Legal Commitment Argument: Too Strenuous
For the argument that Brown v. Board of Education323 was about regulation of racist speech324
instead of about black children’s equal educational opportunity325 to stand as a good argument,
one is without other choices but to ignore two distinctions: the conduct/speech and the
public/private distinction.326 First, at least on its face, Brown outlawed discriminatory conduct,
not speech. Perhaps it could be argued that segregation was held unconstitutional in Brown not
simply because of the bad physical separation of black and white children, but also because of
the message segregation conveys – the message that black children are an untouchable caste,
unfit to be educated with white children.327 But it goes a little too far to argue that Brown is
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For example, the equal protection clause, U.S. Const. amend. XIV, 1., is worded to require the government rather
than private citizens to treat citizens equally. It states: “ … No State shall make or enforce any law which shall
abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of
the laws.” In my opinion, with this law and others and their practical enforcement consistent with the spirit
embodied in them, the pre-political reckoning is already met.
321
For example, incorporated bodies, such as a town, an incorporated village and so on.
322
Or even some white persons, as long as these persons do not constitute a substantial part of the population. Under
that circumstance, one shall hesitate to say that hate speech still does not matter, since it is more systematic, and
perhaps can much distort the political process.
323
347 U.S. 483 (1954).
324
Charles R. Lawrence III, supra note 17, at 438-49.
325
Id., at 438.
326
For a detailed analysis of these two distinctions and a criticism of the legal commitment argument, see Nadine
Strossen, supra note 6, 542-47.
327
Id., at 439.

-55primarily328 based on that message. Do not forget that in Brown there is another thread, that is,
“separate educational facilities are inherently unequal.”329 Thus it could be argued either way
why the Supreme Court reached its holding in Brown. Besides, even if one admits the result in
Brown was primarily dictated by that message of black inferiority, one might ask this question:
why does segregation convey that message? Isn’t it because there are discriminative behaviors
toward them by whites? Isn’t it because there is a black slavery history in America? Suppose that
there were no discrimination against blacks at all, that there had not been the black slavery
history, that whites and blacks were equal in every term, but that segregation had formed by
some natural way, then what message would segregation convey? It is a hard and extreme
question with no easy answer, but to ask it casts doubt on the argument that the result in Brown
was primarily based on the black inferiority message. Even when elaborating on the black
inferiority message, the Supreme Court rested its argument ultimately on the unequal educational
implication of segregation.330 Furthermore, can anyone deny that ideally331 “separate but equal”
is an attainable goal? The reason why this rule was overruled, I figure, is more because
practically332 it is not attainable than because it conveys a message.
The public/private distinction is conflated by this argument also, since the equal protection
clause only restricts government behavior, whereas the first amendment protects the speech of
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Id.
347 U.S. at 495. This is the very argument the plaintiffs made. They contended that “segregated public schools
are not ‘equal’ and cannot be made ‘equal,’ and that hence they are deprived of the equal protection of the laws.” Id.,
at 488.
330
The lower court conclusion approvingly cited by the Supreme Court goes this way: “Segregation of white and
colored children in public schools has a detrimental effect upon the colored children. The impact is greater when it
has the sanction of the law; for the policy of separating the races is usually interpreted as denoting the inferiority of
the negro group. A sense of inferiority affects the motivation of a child to learn. Segregation with the sanction of law,
therefore, has a tendency to [retard] the educational and mental development of negro children and to deprive them
of some of the benefits they would receive in a [racially] integrated school system.” 347 U.S. at 494. See also Id.,
footnote 10.
331
I emphasize the word of “ideally” here.
332
For the same reason, I emphasize the word of “practically” here.
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-56private persons. But how about Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United States,333 in which the Supreme
Court upheld the public accommodations provisions of Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,334
and implicitly rejected the argument that the absence of state action meant that private
discriminators were protected by first amendment free speech and associational rights?335 To this
it should be noted that the provisions were upheld on the basis of Congress’s commerce power
not on the basis of equal protection.336 This case does not say private speech could be regulated
on the basis of equal protection at all. So, when it comes to equal protection, the public/private
distinction still holds.
E. Critique of Egalitarian Counterarguments
Now, we turn to egalitarian counterarguments discussed above in Part III. Let’s take the
counterargument made to the “best friend” argument first. As described above, it is argued that
the system of free speech law has not always served as a staunch ally of minority interests.337 To
this, there are two possible replies. First, the “best friend” argument says free speech, not free
speech law, has been minorities’ best friend historically. So, to focus on free speech law is
somewhat beside the point.338 Second, the fact free speech law has not always been minorities’
333

379 U.S. 241 (1964).
42 U.S.C. §§ 2000a-1 to 2000a-6 (1988).
335
379 U.S. at 258. This argument is made by Charles R. Lawrence III. See Charles R. Lawrence, supra note 17, at
448-49.
336
The motel argued, inter alia, that Congress in enacting Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, supra note 334,
exceeded its power to regulate commerce under Art. I, § 8, cl. 3, of the Constitution of the United States. 379 U.S. at
243-44. The Supreme Court upheld the statute on the basis of Congress’ commerce power instead of equal
protection, Id. at 261, declaring “[w]e, therefore, conclude that the action of the Congress in the adoption of the Act
as applied here to a motel which concededly serves interstate travelers is within the power granted it by the
Commerce Clause of the Constitution, …” Id., though legislative history indicates that “Congress based the Act on
§5 and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment as well as its power to regulate interstate
commerce under Art. I, §8, cl. 3, of the Constitution.” Id. at 249.
337
Richard Delgado, Book Review, supra note 20, at 793.
338
So, to say minorities “minorities have made the greatest progress when they acted in defiance of the First
Amendment,” Richard Delgado & David H. Yun, supra note 1, at 881, is a distortion of history, or at least a
confusion of “speech laws” and “free speech.” Free speech is embodied in the First Amendment, while “speech
laws” are not necessarily consistent with free speech embodied in the First Amendment, so they are perhaps not part
of free speech, thus would be struck down by the Supreme Court. For example, the speech ordinance that
criminalized Martin Luther King, Jr. and others was struck down by the Supreme Court as unconstitutional. See Part
334

-57staunch ally does not undermine the argument that it is generally such an ally. 339 So, the
egalitarian counterargument does not stand. True, black protesters had paid great price to win
their acquittal on appeal, but one must ask this question: if without a commitment to free speech,
would they have been acquitted even after they had paid such a price? 340 Further, if their
protestation was really too intermixed with action or too disruptive of property rights, why
shouldn’t they be convicted anyway?341 They were convicted on some other basis than their
exercising the right to free speech.
The counterargument to the civil libertarian argument that free speech has made United States
great is similarly unsound. Arguably United States enjoys its leading position due to exceptions
to free speech, such as patents, copyrights and so on. But don’t forget that we are all talking
contextually. Within this context, these exceptions are an integrated part of free speech. So, when
civil libertarians are saying free speech has made America great, they are perhaps not talking
about the absolute free, but the contextualized free speech, including those exceptions. If so, this
counterargument is totally beside the point. As to the assertion that “it seems highly likely that
tolerating virulent hate speech and vicious public depiction plays a part in allowing” such forms
III (B) above. That is, it was not a free speech law, but a speech inhibiting law. It should not be included in the
network of free speech laws. Egalitarians should not have used such bad laws – speech-inhibiting laws - to argue
that free speech laws were not an ally of minorities.
339
Anyway we do not oppose something because it has not always produced desired results. Besides, free speech
law is not designed to protect minorities only, why should it have always been their staunch ally? Actually, some
egalitarian’s own statement confirms the point that free speech was beneficial to minorities historically. See, e.g.,
Richard Delgado, Book Review, supra note 20, at 794 (“Speech may have been a vital tool for organizing and for
quickening America’s conscience; free speech law (at least as then interpreted) was not.”).
340
One must also ask a particular question: without a firm commitment to free speech, would the ordinance Martin
Luther King, Jr. was found to have violated have been struck down by the Supreme Court?
341
In a Stanford University incident, President Donald Kennedy refused to grant amnesty for students who took over
his office in their effort to demand more minority faculty and ethnic studies reform, because he thought these
students’ behavior was clearly a violation of Stanford’s policy against campus disruption. This posture attracted
criticism from some egalitarian. It is said this decision is unfair, since white students defaced a poster of 19th century
composer Ludwig von Beethoven to portray a stereotypical black face were unpunished. Charles R. Lawrence III,
supra note 17, 433-34, 467. But is it really unfair? Isn’t these minority students’ behavior too intermixed with
disruptive conduct? And if this office-taking-over conduct should be punished according the university conduct code,
why these students should not be punished? From Mr. Lawrence’s attitude toward these two incidents, it might be

-58of social misery as inequality of wealth and income, high infant mortality and so on, is simply
not well documented. It is just an assertion, not an argument.
How about the counterargument against the “more speech” solution? Admittedly, it is often
very hard or impossible for the victim to respond on the spot; and even to respond later by
writing or speech not specifically targeting the very perpetrator would be difficult since speech is
expensive.342 But do not ignore other possibilities. If the victim cannot afford speech, some
others who can afford speech and are sympathetic with the victim will stand out and talk back.343
Besides, if today the society, as is argued by some civil libertarians, is much more diverse than
before,344 then surely it would be much easier for minorities to find effective representatives.
Indeed, when hate speech incidents increased on campus, egalitarians began to write and speak
against hate speech very extensively. They are minorities’ representatives who have participated
actively in the “marketplace of ideas.” Further, it is undoubtedly true that the marketplace of
ideas has its defects, but this does not establish that hate speech should be regulated by the

fair to say that perhaps he, like other egalitarians, is too close to equal protection. For discussion of this issue, see
Part IV (F) below.
342
If it is really expensive. But I do think the point that speech is expensive is exaggerated.
343
For example, in February 1988, in Dartmouth, four members of The Dartmouth Review confronted William S.
Cole, a Black professor, at the conclusion of his music history class. The newspaper had recently published a highly
critical review of Cole's course. The confrontation turned into a shouting and pushing match between the professor
and Review members. Black students charged that the article and classroom incident were racially motivated, while
the Review insisted that they were simply fair criticism of a professor's teaching ability. Later, a university panel
found three staff members guilty of disorderly conduct, harassment, and invasion of privacy for initiating and
secretly recording the "vexatious exchange" with Cole. The event caused a heated exchange between the Review
and Dartmouth President James O. Freedman, who criticized the newspaper for “poisoning . . . the intellectual
environment,” while the Review charged Freedman with censorship and reverse discrimination and even compared
him, a Jew, with Adolph Hitler. See Richard Delgado, supra note 2, at 349-50 for a more detailed description of this
incident. Whatever our evaluation of this incident, here Dartmouth President James O. Freedman could afford
“expensive” speech and did talk back, though the black professor was not in a position that made him could not
afford more speech. Such talking back, if not successful in convincing the Dartmouth Review members, would have
some good educating effect upon members of the university community. His talking back arguably would have
greater effects than someone else’s, since he was in an authoritative position. Actually, this is a position advocated
by some civil libertarians. See, for example, Jon Weiner, Racial Hatred on Campus, THE NATION, Feb. 27, 1989, at
260, 262 (calling on universities to speak out forcefully and frequently on why racist speech is objectionable). Please
note that Mr. Wiener is calling on “universities” to speak back not just individual students who have been or would
be subjected to hate speech.
344
Richard Delgado, Book Review, supra note 20, at 795-97.

-59government. There is no reason to believe that the government can do a better job, 345 and it may
well do a worse job.346
The problem with the egalitarian counterargument to the “reverse enforcement” argument is
that there is an attitudinal ambivalence in the egalitarian attitudes toward authorities. Remember
when arguing against the position that free speech has been minorities’ best friend, some
egalitarian is really unhappy with the authorities arresting and convicting black protestors who
sat in, marched, and picketed and so on,347 and grudgingly unhappy with courts that too often
viewed black protestors’ speech or expression as too intermixed with action or too disruptive of
property rights. 348 The egalitarians seem to doubt the authorities’ commitment to allowing
minorities equality in free speech. But here, much more confidence is placed with the authorities.
So there is no good basis to worry about reverse enforcement, though there will be some
incidents of reverse enforcement, but these incidents are not the pattern, far from the rule.349 In
short, how can egalitarians be confident that the authorities will not enforce hate speech rules
unequally when they doubt the authorities’ commitment to equal right to free speech? Is it
because society has become much more diverse so that the authorities are different now?350 If so,
then how different? These questions, if not answered, cast doubt on the egalitarian
counterargument. As to the assertion that hate speech rules will not be used to stifle dissenters in
the United States since the United States is more liberal than South Africa and the former Soviet
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David E. Bernstein, supra note 98, at 235.
See, e.g., id. at 236-37 (arguing that the government will entrench itself and expand its power at the expense of
the public, and negative externalities of government regulation are likely to outweigh any negative externalities that
arise from freedom of expression). See also supra note 151.
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Richard Delgado, Book Review, supra note 20, at 793.
348
Id., at 793-94.
349
Richard Delgado & David Yun, supra note 1, at 880.
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It is argued that now society is much more diverse but no evidence is offered to support this argument. See
Richard Delgado, supra note 2, at 795-96.
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-60Union countries,351 one comment can be made: how can we assure that the United States will
always be so? The possibility that the United States will become repressive seems dim, but don’t
forget Korematsu v. United States,352 in which American Japanese were sent to concentration
camps while United States was in a relatively more repressive state.353
The counterargument that there is no need to worry about the slippery slope is already
critiqued above when the uniqueness of harms caused by hate speech is questioned. Here we will
only deal with a specific distinction made by some egalitarians: the distinction between hate
speech and Marxist speech. It is argued that Marxism is not universally rejected by countries all
over the world, while slavery and racial supremacy are, and that this distinction ensures that
regulation of hate speech will not lead to a revival of McCarthyism.354 This distinction is the
weakest distinction made by egalitarians.355 If one day a country or a group of countries begins
to rule on the basis of an official policy of racial supremacy, then where is the difference
between Marxism and racial hate speech? Further suppose not only that some countries begin to
rule on an official racial supremacy policy, but also that Marxism is universally rejected, does
this mean that hate speech based on race shall not be regulated while Marxist speech shall be
prohibited?356
A few more comments on some other counterarguments may end this part of critique. The
argument that hate speech is an aberration and isolated and its harm is minimal, though often just
an assertion, could not be disregarded easily, especially when the scope of hate speech, the
351

See supra note 145.
323 U.S. 214 (1944).
353
When one bears this case in mind, one perhaps would not argue, as Richard Delgado have done, that the
international terrorism crisis is a good opportunity for minorities. Perhaps just the contrary. For example, minorities
are subjected to more stringent examination before boarding a flight.
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Mari J. Matsuda, supra note 2, at 2359.
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See Danny J. Boggs, supra note 136, at 276, where this distinction is criticized.
352

-61severity and uniqueness of harms of hate speech are called into question above.357 And if that
criticism has its merits, then the argument that hate speech regulation will leave minorities little
better off than they are now could not be easily disregarded also.
As to whether it functions as a pressure valve to “allow” people to utter hate speech, this is a
question that could be argued either way. But what is more important and more consistent with
the perspective of internal critique is to criticize the social studies used to support the
counterargument. The “blue eyes/brown eyes” experiment,358 the Stanford experiment assigning
students roles of prisoner and prison guard,359 and the experiment of some authority figures
asking one to give another an electric shock360 are all beside the point here. Why? Because
among these experiments there is a common feature: subjects are affirmatively required by some
authoritative figures to play some roles. The very basis of these experiments is that subjects take
their roles seriously. If they had not, these experiments would have been impossible.361 This
makes them clearly different from hate speech. First, people are not encouraged, and certainly
not affirmatively required, by authoritative figures to utter hate speech. Second, when some
white person says to a black person “you stupid nigger,” the black person needs not to play a
stupid role; he or she can be as smart as possible. Perhaps these social science studies are more
germane to hate speech uttered publicly by official figures, since they are in an official position,
some others would think what they say tend to be right and do accordingly, though they are not
necessarily affirmatively requiring others to do accordingly. But the egalitarians do not assert
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If there is no true distinction established between hate speech and other verbal insults based on poverty or other
extremist speeches like Marxist speech, then the argument that the government will grab the opportunity to censor
and chill speech is not one that could be as easily dismissed as egalitarians have thought.
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See Part IV (C) (3) above.
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Richard Delgado & David Yun, supra note 1, at 879.
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Id.
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Id.
361
Suppose, for example, in the “blue eyes/brown eyes” experiment, children had not taken their roles seriously,
then this experiment perhaps would have brought out no significant result.

-62that there are cases where official figures utter hate speech at all, not to say there are many such
cases. As to the interview study, 362 where it is reported that male sexual offenders did not think
they were offenders at all, there is a problem: how do you know the male sexual offenders have
said what they were really thinking? Isn’t there a great possibility that they were just excusing
themselves of their criminal conduct by so saying? Besides, if not the deterring effect,363 the
curing effect364 of hate speech rules is quite doubtful.
The counterargument offered to the victimization argument is also beside the point. Civil
libertarians are arguing that hate speech rules would “encourage” a crybaby attitude, egalitarians
reply that minorities are not required to file complaints, filing complaints is just another avenue
to deal with hate speech, and filing complaints can be looked at as a way of taking charge of
one’s destiny. But this reply is weak because it does not answer the victimization argument
directly: it does not dispel the possibility that minorities will be “encouraged” to rely upon
authorities. As to the analogies, it should be pointed out that when a car is stolen or a house is
burglarized, the victimizer does not target the victim directly; instead the victimizer targets the
victim’s property directly. This is quite different from hate speech, where one person targets
another person or a group of persons. Besides, when one’s car is stolen or one’s house is
burglarized, one generally does not know who the victimizer is. This is also different from at
least some hate speech, for example, many face-to-face racial slurs.
Egalitarians have made another beside-the-point argument when they are counter arguing
against civil libertarian’s concern of equal treatment of hate speech speakers. Remember that
civil libertarians worry that hate speech rules would have differential effects on blue-collar
people and upper-class people. The point civil libertarians have made is that blue-collar members
362
363

Richard Delgado & David Yun, supra note 1, at 879.
Richard Delgado & Jean Stefanic, supra note 92, at 485.

-63tend to utter more recognizable hate speech, while upper-class members tend to utter some
refined version of hate speech that is not readily recognizable, though they may well harbor even
deeper scorn for minorities than blue-collar members. So, the fact that both blue-collar and
upper-class people will be prohibited from uttering crude racial slurs and epithets is totally
beside the point.
F. Egalitarians: Too Close to Equal Protection
If the internal critique in Part IV stands, and if it really seems that, as is shown above,
egalitarians tend to grasp evidence hastily to support their case of hate speech regulation without
careful analysis, and that when facing some strong attacks from civil libertarians, some
egalitarians do not face them directly, but sidestep them, making counterarguments beside the
point to different degrees, then one might ask why they have done so. Perhaps the most plausible
reason is that they are really too close to the problem.365 When they are too close to the problem,
they are too eager to be adequately calm and reasoned. Thus they will utilize whatever evidence,
such as social science studies and international trends and so on, without doing analysis careful
enough first. Their perspective is so much tainted with passion and anxiety that, when facing a
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Steven G. Gey, supra note 164, at 225. See also, Danny J. Boggs, supra note 136, at 270 (using this example to
exemplify the point: Catharine MacKinnon, who has been very active in this area, was asked about an incident at the
University of Pennsylvania where the student newspaper had run an article critical of affirmative action and of
Malcolm X, and a student group seized all the copies of the newspapers and burned them. And it seems that
Professor MacKinnon took the position that the student group’s newspaper-burning was protected speech. But Judge
Boggs thought that if Professor MacKinnon would certainly not have the same view had it been a male supremacist
group that had been burning a women's magazine. And I think this is a fair inference). Facing such a criticism, it is
counter argued that why civil libertarians do not see themselves to be too close to free speech. See Richard Delgado,
Are Hate-Speech Rules Constitutional Heresy? A Reply to Steven Gey, 146 U. PA. L. REV. 865, 871 (1998). But this
counterargument is still another example of evading but not facing the problem. It is the same beside the point. True,
perhaps civil libertarians are too close to the cause of free speech and too far from that of equal protection, but this
does not dispel the criticism that egalitarians are too close to the cause of hate speech regulation.
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-64very strong argument that it is hard to distinguish hate speech from Marxist speech,366 some
egalitarian even made a distinction between them on an obviously faulty basis.367
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See, for example, Danny J. Boggs, supra note 136, at 274, 279 (arguing that Marxist speech could not be easily
differentiated from various types of so-called hate speech).
367
Mari J. Matsuda, supra note 2, at 2358-60. See Part IV (E) above for a criticism of her argument.
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CHAPTER V
CONCLUSION
Based on Parts II, III and IV, the generally conclusion is that, though egalitarians have made
good arguments in advocating and defending hate speech regulation, evidence they have
garnered does not support their argument very well, especially when it comes to the so-called
face-to-face hate speech regulation. So, if the debate between egalitarians and civil libertarians is
evaluated on and only on this basis, egalitarians will lose, or at least will not win. In the sense
that what civil libertarians have resorted to – free speech – is more entrenched than what
egalitarians have resorted to – equal protection, better arguments need to be made to establish the
case that hate speech should be regulated. The very sense that free speech could be viewed as
more entrenched than equal protection is that free speech went into Constitution much earlier
than equal protection.368
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Free speech entered into the Constitution in 1791, while racial equal protection entered the Constitution in 1868,
and sex equal protection with respect to voting rights entered the Constitution even later: in 1920.
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CHAPTER VI
EPILOGUE: A DEFENSE OF FEDERAL COURT DECISIONS
If the general conclusion in Part V stands and egalitarians have failed, up to now, to
convincingly establish their case that hate speech, especially face-to-face hate speech, should be
regulated, then federal courts’ reluctance to give support to hate speech regulation is quite
understandable. Besides, federal courts’ decisions could be defended in another sense: federal
courts have taken great pains not to close the possibility of some hate speech regulation. This
assertion is supported by both lower court decisions and Supreme Court decisions. In Doe v.
University of Michigan 369 and The UWM Post, Inc. v. Board of Regents of University of
Wisconsin System, 370 hate speech regulations of University of Michigan and University of
Wisconsin were struck down on the basis that they were overbroad and vague.371 Both courts
have avoided categorical statements that under current free speech law framework, hate speech
could not be regulated at all. Similarly, the Supreme Court does not say hate speech cannot be
regulated at all either. In R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul,372 the Supreme Court struck down the St. Paul
Bias-Motivated

Crime Ordinance

373

on

the basis that “the ordinance is facially

unconstitutional” 374 since it “prohibits otherwise permitted speech solely on the basis of the
subjects the speech addresses.” 375 Or, put it another way, it was constitutionally prohibited
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-67content-discrimination376 or viewpoint-discrimination.377 All in all, the court never said in R.A.V.
that hate speech could not be regulated at all. This point is most clearly exemplified by the most
recent hate speech case, Virginia v. Black.378 In this case, the Supreme Court even affirmatively
said that cross burning with the intent to intimate could be banned by a state,379 though it struck
down the Virginia’s cross-burning statute on the basis that the prima facie evidence article that
provided any burning of a cross should be prima facie evidence of an intent to intimidate a
person or group of persons380 was unconstitutional on its face.381 So, it seems that the Supreme
Court and lower federal courts are not as unsympathetic and undependable as claimed by some
egalitarians382 to the egalitarian cause for hate speech regulation, as long as, subject to other
conditions, there is good evidence.383 It follows that that federal courts could be relied upon to
deal with hate speech when it constitutes real threats. This point is confirmed by the hostile
environment cases. 384 For example, in Davis v. Monroe County Board of Education, 385 in
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In Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 123 S. Ct. 1536, the good evidence is there: history shows that cross-burning
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will support broad speech regulation. So to use this fact to support the egalitarian case for hate speech regulation
would be problematic, especially if the advocated regulation is very broad. Therefore, the Supreme Court’s decision
in Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 508 U.S. 476 (1993), that that racial hatred could be considered in determining the
sentence of a convicted defendant does not necessarily mean that the Supreme Court would support hate speech
regulation, especially face-to-face hate speech regulation advocated by egalitarians. But it seems that some
egalitarians used Wisconsin to implicitly support their case for hate speech regulation. See Richard Delgado & David
H. Yun, supra note 1, at 875, where Wisconsin was used to implicitly support hate speech regulation, and Richard
Delgado, Book Review, supra note 20, at 799, where Wisconsin was used expressly to support very broad speech
regulation.
384
These cases include Davis v. Monroe County Board of Education, 526 U.S. 629 (1999) (considering peer
harassment in public schools), Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., 523 U.S. 75 (1998) (considering same sex
harassment in workplaces), Harris v. Forklift Systems, 510 U.S. 17 (1993) (holding that, under Title VII of the Civil

-68reversing the decision of Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit and remanding the case to
that court,386 the Supreme Court held that a private damages action could lie against a recipient
of Title IX funding in cases of student-on-student harassment when the recipient acted with
deliberate indifference in its programs or activities to known acts of harassment387 and when the
harassment is so severe, pervasive, and objectively offensive that it effectively bars the victim’s
access to an educational opportunity or benefit.388 In Harris v. Forklift Systems,389 though Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964390 on its face only barred conduct that would seriously affect
a reasonable person’s psychological well being, the Supreme Court held, as long as the
environment would reasonably be perceived and was perceived as hostile or abusive, there was
no need for it also to be psychologically injurious for it to be actionable. 391 Similarly, in
Monteiro v. Tempe Union High School District, 392 the Ninth Circuit held that the school’s
knowledge of and failure to act upon racial slurs by other students constituted discrimination.393

Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C.S. 2000e-2(a)(1) which barred conduct that would seriously affect a reasonable
person’s psychological well being, there was no need for it also to be psychologically injurious, as long as the
environment would reasonably be perceived and was perceived as hostile or abusive.), Meritor Savings Bank v.
Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986), Monteiro v. Tempe Union High School District, 158 F.3d 1022(9th Cir. 1998), and
Rogers v. EEOC, 454 F.2d 234 (5th Cir. 1971).
385
526 U.S. 629 (1999).
386
Id. at 654.
387
Id. at 632.
388
Id. Or in another word, the harassment constituted a hostile environment, though Justice Kennedy took issue with
the appositeness of applying the concept of hostile environment in this student-on-student harassment context, since
“schools are not workplaces and children are not adults.” Id. at 675 (Kennedy, J., dissenting.) This case undermines
an egalitarian argument for hate speech regulation. See Brownstein, supra note 68, at 19. The argument runs like this:
true, there will be some worst scenarios in which well-intentioned regulations of racist speech are abused by
administrators to stifle robust debate and inquiry in a university, but isn’t there also some equally unacceptable
scenario in which racist expression renders a university environment uninhabitable (or at least educationally useless)
for minority group members? Id. My answer is, yes, there is also such an unacceptable scenario if hate speech is not
regulated. But, wait, isn’t it that this scenario has been taken up by the court in this hostile environment case? When
there comes such an environment, victims can resort to courts for protection. So, the fact that there is such a scenario
does not support that there should be hate speech regulation.
389
510 U.S. 17 (1993)
390
42 U.S.C.S. 2000e-2(a) (1).
391
510 U.S. at 21.
392
158 F.3d 1022 (9th Cir.1998)
393
Id. at 1032-35.

-69In addition, what federal courts have done is wise for several reasons. First, the upsurge of
hate speech on campus in recent years is mostly attributable to a greater presence of minorities
on campus. 394 So, in a sense, the upsurge perhaps is a sign that the American society is
successful in and on the right track of social integration. If viewed in this way, the upsurge is not
so deplorable as egalitarians are arguing. Second, in the sense that hate speech is a part of an
ongoing social-integration process, it is a better thing to do to just observe and see what will
happen,395 especially in the early stage, than to make a sweeping rule that hate speech should be
regulated. Such a rule would silence arguments and impede understanding, would be a decision
too hasty, and would deprive citizens of the opportunity to deal with it themselves. So, federal
courts have done a good job to leave the door open to let there be enough room for further
development. There is evidence396 indicating that federal courts, including the Supreme Court,
are on the right track in this regard.

394
Most studies on the subject and media reports concur in the view that increased racial and ethnic diversity on
American campuses, particularly majority race colleges, is the largest single factor in explaining such conflict. See
Charles H. Jones, supra note 3, at 1390-01, and footnotes 27, 28 and 29.
395
And to interfere when necessary, perhaps, as the hostile environment cases indicate.
396
See, Are There Any Trendlines?  http://www.prejudiceinstitute.org/ethnoviolenceFS.html (last visited on Feb.
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